eBay Inc. — V-MIL Domain Audit

Target Company: eBay Inc. Audit Phase: V-MIL Audit Date: May 2026 Jurisdiction of Incorporation: Delaware, USA (HQ: San Jose, California)

Direct Defence Contracting & Procurement

No public evidence identified of any contract, tender award, framework agreement, or memorandum of understanding between eBay Inc. and the Israeli Ministry of Defense (IMOD), the Israel Defence Forces (IDF), Israel Prison Service, or Israel Border Police.

The IMOD vendor registration portal does not list eBay as a registered vendor or approved supplier ¹. eBay’s structural identity as a B2C/C2C marketplace — operating as a platform intermediary rather than a manufacturer, systems integrator, or service contractor — makes it architecturally unsuited to the B2G procurement model through which Israeli defence agencies acquire goods and services.

No public evidence was identified of eBay appearing in SIBAT (Israel Defence Export Directorate) directories, Israeli defence export catalogues, or international defence exhibition registries in connection with Israeli state contracts ¹. Targeted searches of these directories returned no eBay listings. No corporate press release, government announcement, or procurement gazette entry was identified detailing any defence cooperation, joint venture, or partnership agreement between eBay and Israeli defence entities.

eBay’s Q2 2024 financial reporting ² and broader corporate disclosures contain no segment, line item, or narrative disclosure referencing defence revenue from any jurisdiction, consistent with its non-manufacturer marketplace model.

Dual-Use Products & Tactical Variants

eBay does not manufacture products and therefore does not produce purpose-built militarised or tactical product variants. As a third-party marketplace, its relevance to dual-use analysis lies in platform policy design and documented third-party misuse, not in direct corporate supply.

Platform policy on military items: eBay’s published “Military items policy” ³ draws an explicit civilian/military distinction at the listing level. The policy permits commercially available body armour, tactical optics (rifle scopes, red-dot sights), plate carriers, and ballistic helmets to be listed and sold as civilian products. It restricts or prohibits military-issued ceramic armour plates (SAPI/ESAPI, Level IV “military only” designation), replica or deactivated weapons submitted under misleading descriptions, and other controlled items ³. The policy does not verify the end-user identity or intended end-use at the point of purchase.

Civilian-to-military distinction at point of sale: eBay’s platform does not distinguish civilian from military purchasers. Any Israeli security-force personnel purchasing items through eBay would do so as individual retail customers, not under a state procurement contract. No evidence of purpose-built, military-specified, or contract-modified supply to Israeli state bodies through eBay as a corporate entity was identified.

Export licensing and end-user certification: No public evidence was identified of eBay Inc. filing export licence applications or end-user certificates specifically for sales to Israeli defence or security end-users. eBay’s international shipping seller terms require sellers to comply with applicable export laws including ITAR and EAR ⁴, but enforcement is documented as reactive rather than proactive.

Documented platform vulnerability to dual-use export violations: The US Government Accountability Office documented in 2009, through covert testing, that online platforms including eBay were successfully used to purchase controlled dual-use items — specifically, night vision devices — that were subsequently exported without proper licences ⁵. A Brookhaven National Laboratory export compliance training document cites cases in which eBay served as the purchase venue for subsequently illegally exported controlled items, including night vision equipment destined for Hezbollah and naval sensor technology exported to China ⁶. These cases establish that eBay’s platform has been exploited by third parties for controlled-item acquisition, but the enforcement actions in those cases targeted individual purchasers and exporters, not eBay Inc. as a corporate entity. No eBay-specific enforcement action arising from dual-use sales to Israeli defence end-users was identified.

Heavy Machinery, Construction & Infrastructure

No public evidence identified. eBay does not manufacture heavy machinery, construction equipment, earthmoving vehicles, or related infrastructure plant. It has no manufacturing supply relationship with heavy machinery operators or project contractors.

No NGO investigations, UN documentation, satellite imagery analysis, or photographic evidence was identified linking eBay-sold or eBay-facilitated equipment to settlement construction activity, construction of the separation barrier, military installation development, or demolition activity in occupied Palestinian territories.

No public evidence was identified of any eBay contract for the construction, maintenance, servicing, or expansion of checkpoints, detention facilities, military bases, the separation barrier, or settlement infrastructure in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, or the Golan Heights.

Supply Chain Integration with Defence Primes

No public evidence identified of eBay Inc. providing components, sub-systems, raw materials, or specialist manufacturing services to Elbit Systems, Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, Israel Military Industries, or any other Israeli defence prime contractor. No joint development programmes, co-production agreements, technology transfer arrangements, or licensed manufacturing agreements between eBay and Israeli defence firms were identified.

Historical acquisitions — Israeli intelligence-affiliated founders (R&D context):

A distinct but related pattern merits documentation: across several acquisitions of Israeli technology startups, eBay acquired companies whose founders or senior personnel were publicly identified as veterans of elite IDF intelligence units. The technologies involved are inherently dual-use in the broad methodological sense, though no evidence of direct technology supply from eBay to Israeli defence manufacturers was identified in any case.

• Fraud Sciences (acquired 2008, ~$169 million): A risk analytics company. Co-founders Shvat Shaked and Saar Wilf have been publicly identified as Unit 8200 alumni ⁷. The company’s core product was fraud detection analytics applied to payment risk. No evidence that acquired technology was reverse-supplied to Israeli defence primes post-acquisition.

• The Gifts Project (acquired 2012, ~$20 million): A social commerce startup ⁸. Co-founder Ron Gura has been publicly identified as a Unit 8200 alumnus ⁷. No defence supply chain relevance identified.

• SalesPredict (acquired 2016, ~$40 million): A predictive analytics company whose co-founder Dr. Kira Radinsky subsequently served as Chief Scientist of eBay Israel ⁹¹⁰. Her own public statements, documented in NA’AMAT USA Magazine ⁹ and Reichman University publications ¹⁰, confirm service in Unit 81 (Military Intelligence Technology Unit) and describe the unit’s training as foundational to her data science methodology. SalesPredict’s commercial product was B2B sales forecasting using predictive data mining. No evidence of technology transfer back to Israeli defence primes post-acquisition.

• Corrigon (acquired 2016, ~$30 million): A computer vision and visual search company ¹¹¹². Founder Avinoam Omer has been identified in Israeli tech press as a Unit 8200 alumnus ¹². Corrigon’s technology was applied to product image matching and visual search within eBay’s e-commerce catalogue ¹¹¹³. No evidence of technology transfer to Israeli defence primes post-acquisition ¹¹¹².

These acquisitions represent historical capital flows into Israeli technology companies founded or staffed by IDF intelligence unit veterans. The methodologies involved — fraud analytics, predictive modelling, and computer vision — appear in analogous forms in both commercial and intelligence/military contexts, but no evidence was identified establishing a direct supply or technology-transfer relationship between eBay and Israeli defence manufacturers as a result of these acquisitions.

Logistical Sustainment & Base Services

No public evidence identified of eBay holding contracts to provide catering, transport, fuel, waste management, facilities maintenance, telecommunications, or other support services to IDF bases, military training facilities, detention centres, or security installations in any location, including the West Bank, Golan Heights, East Jerusalem, or the Negev.

eBay International Shipping (eIS) — general Israel operations:

eBay operates the eBay International Shipping (eIS) programme for cross-border delivery ¹⁴⁴. Under this model, US sellers ship goods domestically to a consolidation hub; the international leg is managed by eBay’s logistics partners. Pitney Bowes is documented as a logistics partner for this programme ¹⁵. Israel Post is documented as the default last-mile carrier for standard shipments arriving in Israel, confirmed in seller community discussions ¹⁶. Israel Post is a state-owned entity whose operational mandate extends to delivery across Israel, including to addresses using Israeli postal codes assigned to West Bank settlements.

2025 service pause to Israel:

eBay temporarily suspended eIS service to Israel (and Iraq) in mid-2025 ¹⁷¹⁸. Community announcements confirm the suspension was attributed to operational disruptions, including Israel Post declaring a service emergency ¹⁷¹⁸. Service subsequently resumed ¹⁷. Available evidence characterises the pause as operationally motivated; no corporate policy statement attributing it to political or ethical considerations was identified.

West Bank settlement delivery — structural gap:

eBay’s eIS address forms use “Israel” as the country designation without a documented mechanism to exclude West Bank settlement postal codes from service eligibility. The 7amleh Centre’s e-commerce research ¹⁹ and Euro-Mediterranean Commission of Palestine documentation ²⁰ confirm that Palestinian addresses in the West Bank and Gaza face significant service restrictions or unavailability via standard international e-commerce platforms, while Israeli-designated addresses — including those assigned to settlements — generally remain serviceable. No eBay-specific policy document was identified that explicitly distinguishes between deliveries to Israel within the 1967 Green Line and Israeli settlements in the West Bank. This is a structural feature of address-form design, not a verified affirmative contract with settlement operators or logistics entities. The gap between policy silence and operational practice cannot be resolved through currently available open-source evidence.

Defence logistics / military cargo:

No public evidence identified of eBay holding shipping, freight forwarding, or port handling contracts specifically servicing Israeli defence logistics, military cargo, or arms shipments.

Munitions, Weapons Systems & Strategic Platforms

No public evidence identified. eBay is not a manufacturer of any product and holds no role as a prime contractor, licensed manufacturer, or sub-system supplier for any weapons platform.

No public evidence was identified of eBay supplying ammunition, explosive ordnance, chemical propellants, warhead components, or munitions precursor materials to any defence end-user in any jurisdiction.

No public evidence was identified of eBay involvement — in any corporate capacity — with Iron Dome, David’s Sling, Arrow missile defence, combat aircraft programmes, main battle tank supply, naval vessel construction, or ballistic missile systems.

No sub-system, critical component, or enabling technology supply relationship between eBay and any munitions or strategic platform programme was identified.

Export Licensing, Regulatory & Legal History

Export licence decisions:

No public evidence identified of any government decision — in the United States, United Kingdom, European Union member states, or any other jurisdiction — to grant, deny, suspend, or revoke an export licence specifically for eBay products destined for Israeli military or security end-users. As a marketplace, eBay does not itself hold export licences for goods sold by third-party sellers on its platform; export licence obligations fall to sellers under applicable law ⁴.

Platform misuse in export control enforcement actions:

The US GAO’s 2009 testimony before the Senate ⁵ documented through covert testing that eBay and comparable online platforms were successfully used by testers posing as foreign purchasers to acquire controlled dual-use items — including military-grade night vision devices — that were subsequently exported without proper authorisation. The Brookhaven National Laboratory export compliance document ⁶ cites multiple enforcement cases where eBay was the acquisition venue for items subsequently illegally exported, including night vision equipment linked to Hezbollah and naval sensor technology exported to China. In each documented case, enforcement action was directed at individual purchasers and exporters; eBay Inc. was not cited as a defendant or responsible party. No enforcement actions specifically targeting eBay for violations of arms embargoes or export control regimes in connection with Israel were identified.

Legal proceedings:

No public evidence identified of court proceedings, judicial reviews, regulatory adjudications, or legal challenges brought against eBay or against any government body regarding eBay’s defence supply relationship with Israel. No debarment proceedings, suspension orders, or denial orders issued against eBay by any export control authority in connection with Israeli end-users were identified.

Anti-boycott regulatory pressure:

The National Foreign Trade Council’s submission to the 2026 National Trade Estimate Report process ²¹ reflects ongoing industry engagement with US trade policy, within which eBay as a major e-commerce operator has general interests. No eBay-specific lobbying on Israel-related export controls or anti-boycott legislation was confirmed through available open-source disclosures.

Civil Society Scrutiny & Documented Investigations

NGO and academic research:

• Who Profits Research Center [^37 — root domain only; omitted per end-note policy]: Searched; no confirmed dedicated eBay entry in the Who Profits database specifically addressing military or security supply chain relationships with the Israeli state was identified in available search results as of audit date. Who Profits’ methodology focuses on companies with direct contracts, operations, or product supply to Israeli state entities operating in occupied territories; eBay’s marketplace intermediary model makes it a less typical subject of such entries.

• 7amleh — Arab Center for the Advancement of Social Media: The 2020 report E-Commerce in Palestine ¹⁹ documents systemic barriers to Palestinian access to international e-commerce platforms, noting that platforms commonly treat Palestinian territories (West Bank, Gaza) as either unavailable or as a separately classified service area distinct from Israeli coverage. eBay is identified among several platforms providing significantly reduced access to Palestinian users compared to Israeli users, reflecting broader infrastructure disparities rather than any documented affirmative corporate policy decision.

• AFSC “Investigate” database: Searched; no confirmed eBay entry specifically addressing the V-MIL domain (military or weapons supply) was identified.

• Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, UN treaty body reports: Searched across available publications; no report specifically investigating eBay’s military or defence supply chain relationship with Israel was identified.

• SIPRI Arms Transfer Database: eBay does not appear in SIPRI arms transfer records as a supplier to Israel or any other state [^41 — searched; eBay absence confirmed].

Boycott and divestment campaigns:

• BDS Movement: Searched; no dedicated BDS campaign specifically targeting eBay for defence-sector activities was identified on the BDS Movement’s official campaign infrastructure. The movement’s principal corporate targets in the technology sector have focused on companies with direct contracts for surveillance, cloud infrastructure, or weapons-adjacent systems — notably the Google Project Nimbus campaign — rather than general-purpose e-commerce platforms.

• Anti-boycott pressure (reverse direction): A letter published in Jewish Post and News ²² documents pro-Israel legal advocates writing to eBay citing “Federal and state anti-boycott legislation” and alleging discriminatory pricing and service refusal directed at Israeli-connected buyers. The letter frames eBay’s conduct as potentially unlawful under US anti-boycott statutes. This represents external pressure on eBay to maintain or restore service to Israel — not evidence of eBay being targeted by pro-Palestinian civil society for defence-sector activity specifically.

• Institutional divestment: No evidence identified of pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, or institutional investors publicly divesting from eBay specifically on grounds of defence or security sector relationships with Israel.

2025 Israel R&D centre closure — media framing:

Israeli and international tech press reported in May 2025 that eBay would close its Israel R&D centre, laying off over 200 employees ²³²⁴²⁵. The closure was reported across Globes, EcommerceBytes, and Calcalist/CTech as a business restructuring decision. The Safa News Agency framed the closure as connected to “Gaza atrocities” ²⁶, but this characterisation originates from the outlet’s editorial framing rather than from any eBay corporate statement. No eBay spokesperson, press release, or SEC filing was identified attributing the closure to ethical, political, or conflict-related considerations.

Corporate policy statements on defence supply and Israel:

No public evidence identified of eBay issuing policy statements, terminating contracts, or making end-use monitoring commitments specifically in response to civil society pressure regarding its defence supply chain and Israel. No eBay supplier code of conduct provision, responsible sourcing commitment, or export control policy specifically addressing Israeli military or security end-users was identified in available public corporate disclosures.

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