Ferrari

Target Profile

• Company: Ferrari N.V. / Ferrari S.p.A.
• Jurisdiction: Incorporated in the Netherlands; operational headquarters in Maranello, Italy
• Headquarters: Via Abetone Inferiore 4, 41053 Maranello, Modena, Italy
• Sector: Luxury automotive manufacturing; Formula 1 motorsport
• Relevant operating footprint: Manufacturing and R&D in Maranello and Modena (Italy); no owned facilities in Israel; authorised dealer presence via independent franchisee (Mediterranean Car Agency Ltd. / Auto Italia IL Ltd., Herzliya, Israel)
• Key executives or governance actors: Benedetto Vigna (CEO, Ferrari N.V.); John Elkann (Executive Chairman, Ferrari N.V.; CEO, Exor N.V.); Piero Ferrari (Vice Chairman, Trust Piero Ferrari); Exor N.V. (~21.20% common shares, ~32.17% voting rights); Trust Piero Ferrari (~10.61% common shares, ~16.09% voting rights)
• BDS-1000 score: 125
• Tier: E (0–199)

Executive Summary

Ferrari N.V. is an Italian luxury automotive manufacturer with no direct commercial, contractual, or supply-chain relationship with the Israeli military or state security apparatus. Its BDS-1000 score of 125 (Tier E) reflects a company that is predominantly uninvolved in activities relevant to the occupation of Palestinian territories, with three material exceptions of varying degrees of directness.

The first and most significant is Ferrari’s sustained commercial trade with the Israeli market through an exclusive independent franchise dealer, Mediterranean Car Agency Ltd. / Auto Italia IL Ltd. in Herzliya, through which Ferrari extracts revenue from Israeli consumers without holding any equity in, or operational control over, the franchise entity. This relationship — well-documented in corporate filings and dealer registries — drives the dominant domain score and places Ferrari in the V-ECON band appropriate for a company conducting recurring arm’s-length trade with an occupied-market presence.¹²

The second is a documented double standard in corporate humanitarian communications. Ferrari’s CEO issued a named public statement and announced a €1 million donation in response to the Ukraine crisis in March 2022.³⁴ Ferrari has issued no comparable statement, donation, or market review in response to the Gaza conflict from October 2023 onward, despite the conflict producing civilian casualties at a scale drawing widespread institutional condemnation.⁵ This asymmetry is factually established and analytically significant for the V-POL domain, though the absence of active lobbying, donations to pro-Israel advocacy organisations, or documented staff disciplinary asymmetry prevents elevation above the low band.

The third consists of a set of second- and third-order structural linkages operating through Ferrari’s controlling parent, Exor N.V. These include: Exor Ventures’ documented Israeli technology portfolio (Via Transportation, Quantum Machines, Stardust Solutions); a downstream service-chain adjacency between Ferrari’s Israeli franchisee (Samelet group) and Eltel Ltd., an IDF and IAF vehicle maintenance contractor; and a co-patent with Argus Cyber Security (a Continental AG subsidiary with IDF Unit 8200 alumni founders) on defensive automotive cybersecurity technology.⁶⁷ None of these connections involves Ferrari N.V. directly contracting with Israeli defence entities, and none involves Ferrari vehicles being used in military operations. They are preserved in this dossier as structurally documented indirect associations, not as direct operational relationships.

The composite score of 125 reflects the rubric-accurate conclusion: Ferrari is a luxury goods manufacturer conducting arm’s-length trade in Israel through an independent dealer, owned by a parent with documented Israeli venture capital activity, and silent — by deliberate governance choice — on a humanitarian crisis its own precedents suggest it was capable of addressing.

Timeline of Relevant Events

Corporate Overview

Ferrari N.V. is incorporated under Dutch law (commercial register no. 64060977) and is listed on the New York Stock Exchange and Euronext Milan under the ticker RACE. Its operational headquarters are in Maranello, Italy, where all primary manufacturing, R&D, and brand operations are conducted.¹ The company’s primary corporate purpose is the design, engineering, manufacture, and sale of ultra-luxury sports cars and related merchandise and licensing — a product profile that places it entirely outside the defence, technology services, construction, and agricultural sectors most commonly associated with Israeli occupation-economy involvement.

Governance is concentrated through a loyalty voting share mechanism that amplifies the voting power of long-term shareholders. As of early 2026, Exor N.V. holds approximately 21.20% of common shares but commands approximately 32.17% of total voting rights; Trust Piero Ferrari holds approximately 10.61% of common shares and 16.09% of voting rights, giving the two coordinating blocs over 48% of voting power combined.⁸ Exor N.V. is the Agnelli family holding company, controlled through Giovanni Agnelli B.V., and chaired and managed by John Elkann, who simultaneously serves as Executive Chairman of Ferrari N.V. This dual role binds strategic and capital allocation decisions between Ferrari and its parent at the board level.

Exor N.V.’s investment portfolio spans Ferrari, Stellantis, CNH Industrial, Juventus Football Club, The Economist Group, Institut Mérieux, and Via Transportation, among others.⁸ Exor Ventures, Exor’s early- and growth-stage venture arm, has deployed capital into technology startups globally, including a documented cluster of Israeli technology companies discussed in detail in the V-ECON and V-MIL domain sections below.

Ferrari’s disclosed technology partner ecosystem is anchored by US-origin cloud and computing suppliers: Amazon Web Services (cloud infrastructure, data analytics, machine learning, and F1 fan engagement),⁹ IBM (hybrid cloud and AI race analytics for Scuderia Ferrari),¹⁷ and HP Inc. (computing and printing infrastructure for racing operations).¹² No Israeli-origin vendor has been confirmed in Ferrari’s disclosed technology stack.

In Israel, Ferrari’s sole authorised market presence is Mediterranean Car Agency Ltd. / Auto Italia IL Ltd. in Herzliya, an independently owned franchise entity in which Ferrari N.V. holds zero equity.¹² Ferrari employs no staff directly in Israel and holds no tax registration, real estate, or operational infrastructure in the country.

Domain Summaries

V-MIL: Military

Mechanism of Involvement

Ferrari N.V. and Ferrari S.p.A. have no direct defence contracting relationship with any Israeli state security body. A comprehensive review of Ferrari’s 2024 Annual Report, Exor annual reports, SIBAT listings, international defence exhibition catalogues, and procurement databases identified no contract, tender, framework agreement, or memorandum of understanding between any Ferrari corporate entity and the Israeli Ministry of Defence, the IDF, the Israel Prison Service, or the Israel Border Police.¹ Ferrari’s product line consists exclusively of high-performance luxury road cars; the company manufactures no utility vehicles, armoured personnel carriers, tactical platforms, ruggedised vehicles, or any automotive category with documented military end-use. No militarised variant of any Ferrari vehicle has been identified in any procurement record, export licence, or defence industry publication.

The V-MIL Impact score of 1.50 (Incidental band, 1.0–2.0) reflects this absence of direct engagement. The rubric places a civilian luxury goods manufacturer with no identified defence contracts firmly at the low end of the Impact scale. The scoring is grounded in three negative findings: no direct IMOD/IDF contract exists; Ferrari’s products do not appear in any export control commodity control list as controlled dual-use goods requiring specific Israeli military end-user licences; and no government decision to grant, deny, suspend, or revoke an export licence for Ferrari products to Israeli security end-users has been identified in any jurisdiction.

The most structurally proximate military adjacency is a multi-step downstream service relationship. Ferrari’s sole authorised Israeli importer and dealer, Mediterranean Car Agency Ltd. (operating under the Samelet Group, Herzliya), is documented as a certified service partner of Eltel Ltd., an Israeli defence and logistics contractor.⁷ Eltel’s November 2025 corporate brochure states it maintains over 1,000 IDF and IAF vehicles — including ZMAG/ZD/ZBAR tactical all-terrain vehicles, AM General HMMWVs, and JBT/Oshkosh airbase tractors — under certified service agreements with both Delek Motors and Samelet.⁷ The relationship chain is therefore: Ferrari N.V. (licensor/franchisor) → Mediterranean Car Agency/Samelet Group (independent franchisee, zero Ferrari equity) → Eltel Ltd. (IDF/IAF vehicle maintenance contractor). This is a three-step indirect chain mediated by an independent commercial entity.

Critically, Ferrari vehicles are not among the military platforms maintained under the Eltel contract. Eltel’s documented vehicle portfolio comprises tactical off-road vehicles and airbase ground support equipment — categories for which Iveco, Jeep, or Subaru-brand vehicles distributed by other Samelet brands are far more plausible technical contributors than Ferrari’s road cars. Ferrari N.V. does not hold, direct, or control this downstream relationship, and no contractual or operational evidence indicates Ferrari was aware of, sanctioned, or commercially benefited from Eltel’s military maintenance activities specifically.⁷ The Magnitude score of 2.50 (Very Low Upper End) reflects this: there is no identifiable supply volume flowing from Ferrari to any Israeli military entity. The Proximity score of 2.50 (Very Low Upper End) reflects the three-step structural distance and the absence of Ferrari vehicles from Eltel’s military portfolio.

A second structural link involves a co-patent between Ferrari S.p.A. and Argus Cyber Security, documented in Irish Intellectual Property Office Journal filings.¹⁸¹⁹ The primary filing (IT202300024639A1) covers vehicle control units incorporating network partitioning systems designed to isolate safety-critical automotive networks from compromised communication networks — a defensive cybersecurity architecture. Argus Cyber Security was founded by IDF Unit 8200 alumni and acquired by Continental AG (Germany) in 2017; it operates as a subsidiary of a German automotive tier-1 supplier, not as a standalone Israeli defence contractor. The patent’s documented application is defensive in character (anomaly detection, network partitioning for vehicle cybersecurity), with no identified kinetic military output, no confirmed IDF supply contract, and no direct interface with Israeli state security bodies.¹⁸¹⁹ Ferrari separately holds a multi-year cybersecurity collaboration with Bitdefender (Romania).²⁰ The Argus co-patent represents a technical research relationship with a company that has IDF alumni heritage, but the operative entity at the time of the filings is a Continental AG subsidiary producing civilian automotive security tools.

A third-order connection exists via Exor Ventures’ investment in Via Transportation. Exor N.V. led a $200 million Series E investment in Via Transportation, acquiring approximately 18% of Via’s share capital.²¹ Via’s co-founders are documented graduates of the IDF’s Talpiot programme, and Via’s SEC filings disclose that over 20% of its Israeli workforce was called to active IDF reservist duty following the October 2023 escalation, with further reservist call-ups following Iran-related escalation in mid-2025.²² Via’s platform manages logistics and transit software in Israel, including municipal transit via Israel’s Ministry of Transport and delivery logistics for Shufersal (Israel’s largest supermarket chain).²² No publicly documented IDF contract for Via’s software has been confirmed; the company’s stated mission is civilian transportation optimisation. This connection sits two ownership layers away from Ferrari N.V. (Ferrari generates profits → Exor N.V. as controlling shareholder → Exor N.V.’s independent investment in Via) and has no direct Ferrari corporate decision-making involvement.

Exor Ventures’ investment mandate, managed through Ora Global (spun out of Exor Ventures and led by former Exor Managing Director Noam Ohana), lists “Defense Tech,” “Military,” “Cyber Security,” and “Security” among its documented technology vertical preferences.²³ No specific Ora Global portfolio company with a confirmed, active IDF prime contract has been independently verified in available evidence beyond the Via Transportation investment noted above. The attribution of this mandate to Ferrari N.V. itself requires passing through multiple holding layers and independent investment decisions.

No public evidence has been identified of Ferrari appearing in the databases of Who Profits, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the American Friends Service Committee, or UN Human Rights Council reports as a subject of investigation for military or dual-use supply chain relationships with the Israeli state. No BDS campaign specifically targeting Ferrari on defence grounds has been identified.

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

The principal challenge to the low V-MIL score is the Samelet → Eltel relationship. A reviewer could argue that Ferrari’s exclusive franchise agreement with the Samelet group provides Ferrari with constructive awareness of Samelet’s broader business activities, including its role as a certified service partner to an IDF vehicle maintenance contractor. This argument, however, requires attributing legal and moral responsibility across two independent commercial entities for activities in which Ferrari vehicles play no role. The rubric requires proximity and impact evidence, and neither criterion is met: Ferrari vehicles are not in Eltel’s military portfolio, and the chain is three steps long with an independent commercial intermediary at each step.

The Argus co-patent is the strongest single structural link, but it is limited by Argus’s post-2017 status as a Continental AG subsidiary rather than a standalone Israeli defence firm. The question of whether Continental AG’s ownership of Argus neutralises the IDF Unit 8200 alumni heritage for scoring purposes is a genuine analytical uncertainty. The conservative position — taken here — is that the operative entity contracting with Ferrari is an automotive cybersecurity subsidiary of a German company, not a direct IDF supplier, and that the application of the shared patent is civilian automotive cybersecurity. An auditor taking an expanded view of alumni networks and dual-use technology could argue for a slightly higher Proximity score, but this would not materially change the composite.

The most significant factual gap is the absence of live SIBAT database access and a direct search of the Who Profits database. If either database contained a Ferrari N.V. or Ferrari S.p.A. entry not captured in training data, this finding would require score revision. A confirmatory database query is recommended before publication. Similarly, Exor Ventures’ full portfolio has not been publicly disclosed at the investment-by-investment level; it is possible that undisclosed portfolio companies include IDF prime contractors. The current score cannot account for evidence that does not exist in available public sources.

Named Entities and Evidence Map

V-DIG: Digital

Mechanism of Involvement

Ferrari N.V. does not operate as a technology provider or digital services company. In the V-DIG domain, Ferrari is assessed exclusively as a procurer and consumer of digital technology from third-party vendors. The Customer Cap rule under the scoring rubric applies, capping the Impact score at Band 3 (3.0 maximum) regardless of what is found in Ferrari’s vendor stack. The V-DIG scores — Impact 1.50, Magnitude 1.50, Proximity 1.50, all in the Incidental / Very Low band — reflect the absence of any confirmed Israeli-origin technology in Ferrari’s disclosed vendor relationships.

Ferrari’s disclosed enterprise technology stack is composed entirely of US-origin and European vendors. The three principal partnerships are: Amazon Web Services (multi-year strategic partnership announced 2021, covering cloud infrastructure, data analytics, machine learning, and F1 digital fan engagement);⁹ IBM (longstanding Scuderia Ferrari partnership covering hybrid cloud, AI race-strategy analytics, and performance computing);¹⁷ and HP Inc. (title partnership from 2024, supplying workstations and printing infrastructure for racing operations).¹² All three are US-origin companies headquartered in California, New York, and Washington State respectively. No Israeli-origin enterprise software vendor — including Check Point, Wiz, SentinelOne, CyberArk, NICE Systems, Verint, or Claroty — appears in any Ferrari press release, annual report, technology partner page, or trade-press disclosure reviewed for the period 2020–2024.

Ferrari’s March 2023 ransomware attack, which resulted in the exfiltration of customer personal data (names, addresses, email addresses, telephone numbers) and a ransom demand, constitutes a material evidence gap for this domain.¹¹ Ferrari confirmed the breach publicly but did not disclose the identity of its incident-response forensic vendors or the endpoint security products deployed in remediation. It is structurally possible that one or more post-breach vendors carried Israeli R&D heritage — CrowdStrike, for instance, maintains significant R&D operations in Israel, and Sygnia is an Israeli-founded incident response firm. No public source has confirmed either as a Ferrari vendor. The absence of disclosure is standard corporate practice and does not constitute affirmative evidence of Israeli-origin IR vendor engagement; nor does it permit ruling it out.

A second structural gap involves Ferrari’s AWS partnership. The AWS Marketplace ecosystem includes Israeli-origin SaaS integrations available as optional add-on services to AWS customers — including Check Point CloudGuard and Wiz for cloud security posture management.⁹ Whether Ferrari has procured any such add-on Israeli-origin services within its AWS environment is undisclosed in any public source. This is an inherently unresolvable gap from public-source audit methodology.

Ferrari does not operate a consumer-facing content platform, algorithmic social media service, or editorial publishing operation. It therefore presents no surface area for the content moderation, surveillance deployment, or algorithmic bias findings that characterise high-scoring V-DIG entities. Ferrari’s AI and autonomous-systems activities are confined to the automotive domain: Formula 1 race-strategy algorithms, aerodynamics simulation, driver assistance systems, and performance modelling developed in partnership with AWS and IBM.⁹¹⁷ No provision of these capabilities to any Israeli state actor has been documented.

The Argus Cyber Security co-patent — a defensive automotive cybersecurity application — is classified and scored under V-MIL per the audit scope note, as it relates to vehicle security architecture involving a company with IDF alumni heritage rather than Ferrari’s enterprise digital services procurement. Ferrari holds no R&D facilities, engineering offices, or innovation laboratories in Israel. No Israeli-origin acquisition or equity investment at the Ferrari N.V. level has been identified in annual reports or M&A records for 2018–2024.

Ferrari does not participate in Project Nimbus — the Israeli government’s multi-cloud programme awarded to AWS and Google — nor could it logically do so, as it is a luxury automotive manufacturer with no government cloud services business.²⁶

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

The strongest challenge to the low V-DIG score is the combination of the undisclosed post-breach IR vendor identity and the AWS marketplace add-on gap. A reviewer could argue that Ferrari’s failure to disclose its incident-response vendor selection creates a plausible inference of Israeli-origin product use, given that Israeli cybersecurity firms (CrowdStrike with Israeli R&D, Sygnia, Check Point) are among the most prominent incident-response providers globally. This inference, however, is probabilistic rather than evidentiary, and the rubric requires confirmed evidence to elevate a score. The Customer Cap rule further constrains this: even if a confirmed Israeli-origin endpoint tool were identified, Ferrari’s status as a pure technology buyer caps the Impact score at 3.0. The domain composite would remain well below V-ECON’s contribution to the overall score.

The second gap is the absence of a complete sub-tier vendor disclosure for Scuderia Ferrari’s F1 technical operations. Sub-tier vendors in telemetry processing, computational fluid dynamics simulation, or race data analytics could theoretically include Israeli-origin products not individually disclosed. Again, this is structurally unknowable from public sources and does not justify score elevation absent confirmed evidence.

The Who Profits database gap (live search not available at audit time) applies to the V-DIG domain as it does to V-MIL. A direct database query is recommended before publication to confirm that no Ferrari-specific digital technology entry exists.

Named Entities and Evidence Map

V-ECON: Economic

Mechanism of Involvement

The V-ECON domain produces the highest domain score (3.94) and drives the composite BDS-1000 result. The primary mechanism is Ferrari’s sustained commercial trade with the Israeli market through an exclusive independent franchise dealer. Mediterranean Car Agency Ltd. / Auto Italia IL Ltd. — an independently owned Israeli entity in which Ferrari N.V. holds zero equity — operates as Ferrari’s sole authorised importer and dealer in Israel, with showroom, sales, and service operations in Herzliya.¹² Ferrari’s role is strictly that of wholesale vehicle exporter to the independent franchise; it does not act as importer of record for its own goods into Israel and does not employ staff or hold property in the country.

The franchise relationship is real, ongoing, and exclusive. It encompasses Ferrari’s full Israeli brand offering, including Ferrari Classiche heritage certification and the Ferrari Approved certified pre-owned programme, both operating under Ferrari’s brand standards and franchise terms.¹² The Impact score of 3.50 (Sustained Trade / Low Upper End, Band 3.1–3.9) reflects the rubric’s explicit placement of exclusive dealer franchise arrangements in this band: Ferrari is conducting recurring, contractual, branded trade in Israel, extracting revenue from the Israeli economy (through wholesale margins on vehicles delivered to the franchisee) without making corresponding capital investments into it.

Israeli new car deliveries tracked a five-year low during the period under review,²⁹ reflecting broader market conditions, but this does not alter the structural character of the relationship — a long-term exclusive franchise agreement that generates ongoing revenue flows irrespective of volume fluctuations in any given year.

The Magnitude score of 4.50 (Low Mid, Band 4.0–5.0) is scored conservatively, reflecting the structural unavailability of Ferrari-specific Israel revenue data. Israel is not a disclosed revenue segment in Ferrari’s annual reports or 20-F filings; geographic revenues are reported only in broad regional aggregations.⁵ Without a confirmed Israel-specific revenue figure, inflating the Magnitude score would violate the accuracy counterweight principle. The franchise relationship is ongoing and recurring, but its scale in absolute terms is not quantifiable from public sources.

The Proximity score of 5.50 (Low Upper End, Band 5.1–6.0) reflects Ferrari’s status as the direct upstream franchisor in the exclusive distribution relationship. Ferrari N.V. contracts directly with the franchisee to supply vehicles, brand standards, and certification programmes; this is a direct commercial contractual relationship that distinguishes Ferrari’s Israel exposure from a purely passive or arms-length market arrangement.

The second-order economic linkage is Ferrari’s controlling parent, Exor N.V., and its venture capital arm Exor Ventures. Exor N.V. has deployed capital into a documented cluster of Israeli technology companies via Exor Ventures, including: Via Transportation (Exor led a $200M Series E, ~18% stake), which operates an R&D centre in Tel Aviv and manages Israeli municipal transit and logistics software;²² Quantum Machines (quantum computing control systems, Tel Aviv); and Stardust Solutions (solar geoengineering startup, co-founded by former Israeli government nuclear physicists, $60M round with Exor participation confirmed in 2025).¹⁶ Exor Ventures’ Israeli venture activity is managed in part through Ora Global, led by former Exor Managing Director Noam Ohana.²³

These investment flows represent a genuine economic linkage between the Exor/Ferrari ownership structure and the Israeli technology ecosystem. The analytical framing is important, however: these are Exor N.V.’s independent investment decisions, not Ferrari N.V.’s corporate actions. Ferrari N.V. does not appear as a direct investor in any Israeli company in its own consolidated financial statements. The capital flow mechanism is: Ferrari generates global profits → pays dividends to Exor N.V. as controlling shareholder → Exor N.V. independently deploys aggregated capital including into Israeli venture investments. This indirect pathway is captured through the Proximity score at the Ferrari N.V. level (reflecting the direct franchise contract, not the Exor investments themselves) and documented as context for the overall assessment.

Ferrari is notably absent from the OHCHR database of businesses involved in activities related to Israeli settlements, which covers construction, real estate, mining, surveillance, demolition equipment, and banking sectors — none of which are relevant to Ferrari’s operational profile.³⁰ Ferrari’s Human Rights Practice document references adherence to UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, and the International Bill of Human Rights,³¹ but contains no territory-specific sourcing or labeling policy, consistent with a non-food, non-retail company profile.

The VS Ferrari disambiguation is material to this domain: the Who Profits database profiles Zoko Enterprises as an Israeli heavy equipment supplier to the Israeli Ministry of Defence and lists “VS Ferrari” among Zoko’s represented brands.³² VS Ferrari (also styled CVS Ferrari) is an entirely separate Italian company manufacturing heavy industrial port equipment; it shares only a surname with Ferrari N.V. No corporate, legal, financial, or supply chain relationship between Ferrari N.V. (Maranello) and VS Ferrari has been identified. The homonymic overlap could mislead a surface-level review.

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

The central challenge to the V-ECON score is the propriety of attributing Exor Ventures’ Israeli portfolio activity to Ferrari N.V.’s domain score. A reviewer could argue that because Ferrari profits ultimately flow upward to Exor and are partially redeployed into Israeli technology investments, Ferrari should bear a higher Impact or Magnitude score reflecting the full Exor ecosystem. The counter-argument — adopted in the scoring — is that the rubric distinguishes between the scoring entity and its parent holding company, and that Exor’s independent investment decisions should properly affect Proximity (as evidence of the owner’s orientation and relationships) rather than Ferrari’s Impact score (which requires Ferrari N.V. itself to be the economic actor). This position is consistent with the rubric’s explicit treatment of exclusive dealer arrangements as a Proximity rather than deep-integration factor.

The most significant evidence gap is the undisclosed Israel-specific revenue figure. If Ferrari’s annual Israeli vehicle sales were confirmed at a material level — particularly relative to total Ferrari revenue — this would support a slightly higher Magnitude score. However, the current five-year low in Israeli new car deliveries and Ferrari’s overall small production volumes (approximately 13,700 cars in 2023) suggest Israeli sales represent a modest fraction of global revenue. Conservative scoring reflects this.

The 2014 Kardan/Alon ownership transaction for Auto Italia IL Ltd. is the most recent confirmed public record of franchisee ownership structure.³³ Current beneficial ownership as of 2025–2026 has not been confirmed by a more recent public filing. If current ownership has changed materially — for example, if an entity with closer ties to Israeli state institutions acquired the franchise — this would require re-evaluation.

The unverified status of several Exor Ventures investments (PhaseV, Luminescent, Decart as directly Exor-led) means the full scale of Exor’s Israeli portfolio exposure cannot be confirmed from corporate filings alone. Confirming these investments via Israeli technology press or Exor annual report disclosure would provide a more complete picture of the parent’s Israeli ecosystem commitment.

Named Entities and Evidence Map

V-POL: Political

Mechanism of Involvement

The V-POL domain score of 0.77 reflects a documented pattern of selective humanitarian communication asymmetry rather than active political advocacy for Israeli state interests. Ferrari’s political exposure in this domain is characterised by what it chose not to do, assessed against an evidentiary baseline of what it demonstrably chose to do in a structurally comparable situation.

The comparison is precisely documented. In March 2022, in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, CEO Benedetto Vigna issued a named, emotionally framed public statement declaring: “Ferrari stands alongside everyone in Ukraine affected by this ongoing humanitarian crisis. While we hope for a rapid return to dialogue and a peaceful solution, we cannot remain indifferent to the suffering of everyone affected.”³ On 8 March 2022, Ferrari N.V. published a formal press release announcing a donation of €1,000,000 to support Ukrainian civilians, routed through the Emilia-Romagna Region in collaboration with the Red Cross and UNHCR.³ Ferrari simultaneously suspended all vehicle production and exports to Russia.⁴ The 2022 Sustainability Report documents the Ukraine donation within Ferrari’s distributed economic value to stakeholders.¹⁰

Ferrari has issued no equivalent response to the Gaza conflict at any point from October 2023 through the date of this audit. Ferrari’s 2024 Annual Report mentions the Israel-Hamas conflict once, exclusively as a macroeconomic risk factor affecting luxury goods demand and global supply chains.⁵ No CEO statement, humanitarian donation, market suspension, or operational review was announced. The Ferrari Owners Club Israel — officially sanctioned by Ferrari N.V. and listed on its corporate website since 2020 — continued normal operations, including organised road trips described in standard lifestyle language with no acknowledgment of contested territorial status or the ongoing conflict.³⁵

The Impact score of 2.50 (Low / Double Standard, Band 2.1–3.0) is grounded in this documented asymmetry. The rubric’s Band 2.1–3.0 captures entities whose selective silence — despite a history of vocal activism on comparable geopolitical events — represents a meaningful political act of omission. Ferrari’s Ukraine response establishes that the company was organisationally capable of issuing humanitarian statements, directing seven-figure donations, and suspending market activity in response to major conflicts. The absence of any equivalent action on Gaza is not explicable by organisational incapacity; it is a governance choice.

The Proximity score of 8.50 (High / Controller/Architect, Band 8.3–8.9) is the highest per-criterion score in this audit and requires careful justification. The scoring logic is that the act being assessed — Ferrari’s corporate communications policy and its selective application — is entirely Ferrari’s own governance decision. CEO Vigna signed the Ukraine statement; the Ferrari N.V. board authorised the donation; no intermediary is involved. The act of not issuing a statement is equally a direct governance decision by the same actors. High Proximity is warranted because there is no distributional chain between Ferrari’s decision-making and the political act scored: Ferrari is the direct first-order actor (or deliberate non-actor) in its own political communications. The Magnitude score of 2.50 (Very Low Upper End) reflects that the comparative asymmetry is a qualitative finding — there is no active lobbying frequency, donation volume, or advocacy activity to quantify in scale terms.

The secondary V-POL findings are as follows. Lewis Hamilton, who signed a multi-year contract with Scuderia Ferrari for the 2025 season, made a personal visit to a Gaza aid facility in Jordan in late 2024, publicly praised the Palestine Red Crescent Societies, and called for unrestricted humanitarian access to Gaza.¹³ Ferrari issued no corporate response — no amplification, no endorsement, no matched donation. This further underscores the selective silence pattern but is a secondary indicator rather than a primary scored finding.¹⁵

John Elkann joined the Meta Platforms Board of Directors in January 2025.¹⁴ Meta has been the subject of a UN Special Rapporteur report (A/79/319, August 2024) documenting alleged algorithmic suppression of Palestinian content during the Gaza conflict.³⁶ Elkann’s board seat is held in his personal capacity; his individual influence on Meta’s specific content enforcement policies cannot be attributed from public records. This is documented as a governance-level adjacency, not a scored Ferrari corporate action.

Ferrari holds an AWS cloud services agreement for manufacturing and innovation infrastructure.⁹ AWS is simultaneously a Project Nimbus contractor, providing cloud and AI infrastructure to the Israeli government and IDF under a reported $1.2 billion contract.²⁶ Ferrari’s commercial AWS workloads are standard enterprise cloud procurement; no evidence establishes that Ferrari’s workloads are operationally integrated with Project Nimbus infrastructure. This is an evidence gap, not a confirmed linkage, and does not affect the score.

No public evidence has been identified of Ferrari N.V. or Exor N.V. registering as lobbyists before any government body on Israel-Palestine matters, holding corporate membership in AIPAC, the Jewish National Fund, the Friends of the IDF, or any comparable pro-Israel advocacy organisation, or making financial contributions to Israeli settlement organisations. No employee disciplinary asymmetry — differential enforcement of political expression policies between pro-Palestinian and pro-Israeli speech — has been identified in Italian labour press, union communications (FIOM-CGIL), or employment tribunal records. The absence of active advocacy, lobbying, and donation activity is why the Impact score remains at Band 2.1–3.0 rather than rising to Band 4+ (which would require evidence of active suppression, staff targeting, or shareholder accountability obstruction).

The FCA Foundation’s approximately 45 million Swiss Franc donation to the CERN Science Gateway — inaugurated October 2023 with John Elkann speaking at the ceremony³⁷ — is noted as context. Israel is a full CERN member state, but the donation is directed at a universal multilateral scientific institution with 23 member states, not at Israeli institutions within CERN. No Ferrari or Exor position on academic campaigns calling for CERN to suspend Israeli institutional participation has been identified.

Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

The most significant challenge to the V-POL score is whether the Ukraine/Gaza asymmetry constitutes a genuine political act or simply reflects the reality that Ferrari, like most luxury brands, responds selectively to conflicts based on proximity to its European consumer base, executive cultural background, and reputational risk calculus rather than any conscious alignment with Israeli state interests. Under this reading, Ferrari’s silence on Gaza is commercially motivated rather than politically motivated, and placing it in Band 2.1–3.0 overstates political significance. This counter-argument has merit but is insufficient to reduce the score to Band 1 (no political involvement): the Ukraine response itself was framed in humanitarian rather than commercial terms, and the rubric assesses the existence of asymmetric treatment, not the inferred motivation behind it.

A second challenge concerns the Elkann/Meta board seat. A reviewer could argue that a board seat at a company subject to documented Palestinian content suppression criticism constitutes a higher-Impact political association than is scored here. The counter-argument is that Elkann’s board seat is personal and general; no evidence links his presence on the Meta board to specific content enforcement decisions about Palestinian material. Attribution of Meta’s platform policies to Ferrari N.V. via this route would require inferential steps not supported by available evidence.

The principal evidence gap in V-POL is the unverified Elkann/Yad Vashem visit and Appeal of Conscience Foundation speech citation. Prior research attributes a visit and a related public statement to Elkann, but the specific year, text, and venue could not be independently confirmed against Appeal of Conscience Foundation records.³⁸ This claim is therefore preserved as unverified and excluded from the scored findings.

The Talpiot affiliation of Via Transportation’s co-founders — documented as unverified from independent sources — is likewise excluded from scored V-POL findings, though the SEC disclosure of IDF reservist workforce impact is confirmed and noted in V-MIL.

Named Entities and Evidence Map

Cross-Domain Counter-Arguments and Evidence Limits

The composite score of 125 (Tier E) is anchored by a dominant V-ECON finding (3.94) and three lower domain scores that individually reflect genuine absence of evidence rather than insufficiency of research effort. The cross-domain counter-argument worth addressing most directly is whether the cumulative weight of indirect associations — Samelet/Eltel (V-MIL), undisclosed IR vendors (V-DIG), Exor Ventures’ Israeli portfolio (V-ECON), and the double-standard silence (V-POL) — constitutes a pattern of systemic facilitation that the numeric scores understate.

This argument has some surface plausibility, but it conflates proximity with materiality. The scoring rubric explicitly discounts indirect connections mediated through independent commercial entities and ownership layers, and the formula’s treatment of Sum_OTHERS contributions (weighted at 20% of the non-dominant domains’ sum) is designed to prevent a pile-up of marginal findings from overriding the absence of direct material involvement. Ferrari is not, by any confirmed evidence, a direct contributor to Israeli military operations, settlement construction, surveillance infrastructure, or political advocacy. Its indirect associations are genuine but structurally distant.

The most defensible case for a higher score would require confirming one of the following: (a) a direct Ferrari N.V. contract with an Israeli state security body; (b) a confirmed Israeli-origin product in Ferrari’s enterprise vendor stack at a material scale; (c) Exor Ventures’ portfolio including a confirmed IDF prime contractor with an active kinetic supply relationship; or (d) a documented instance of Ferrari applying asymmetric staff or shareholder accountability enforcement related to Gaza. None of these is supported by available evidence.

Named Entities and Evidence Map

BDS-1000 Score

BDS-1000 Score: 125 — Tier E (0–199)

V-ECON is the dominant domain (V_MAX = 1.768). The composite formula applies a 20% weight to the sum of the three non-dominant domain scores (Sum_OTHERS = 1.153; weighted contribution = 0.231). BRS = ((1.768 + 0.231) / 16) × 1000 = 124.9 ≈ 125.

The V-POL score illustrates the interaction between a high Proximity value and a constrained Impact score: despite Proximity reaching 8.50 (High / Controller-Architect, reflecting Ferrari’s direct governance responsibility for its own communications), the low Impact score (2.50, Low / Double Standard) caps the domain’s contribution to 0.77. This is rubric-accurate: selective silence is a meaningful finding but it is not the same as active military supply or direct investment in settlement infrastructure.

V-DIG’s 0.07 domain contribution reflects the Customer Cap’s operation in practice. Ferrari procures technology rather than provides it; the absence of confirmed Israeli-origin vendor relationships in its disclosed stack pushes all three criteria to the incidental band.

Confidence, Limits, and Open Questions

High confidence findings:

• No direct Ferrari N.V./S.p.A. contract with any Israeli defence or state security body exists in available public records
• The Samelet/Mediterranean Car Agency franchisee structure (zero Ferrari equity) is fully documented
• The Samelet → Eltel IDF/IAF vehicle maintenance chain is confirmed, with the explicit caveat that Ferrari vehicles are not in Eltel’s military portfolio
• The Ukraine/Gaza communications asymmetry is established by primary source documents
• The Argus co-patent is confirmed; Argus’s Continental AG ownership status is confirmed
• Exor’s ~18% Via Transportation stake and Via’s SEC reservist disclosures are confirmed
• Ferrari’s absence from the OHCHR settlement database and BDS targeted companies list is confirmed

Moderate confidence findings:

• Exor Ventures’ Israeli portfolio scope (Quantum Machines, Stardust Solutions confirmed; PhaseV, Luminescent, Decart as Exor-led investments marked as unverified from corporate filings)
• The existence of an Ora Global / Exor Ventures physical Tel Aviv presence (plausible from Ora Global website but not confirmed at lease/registration level)
• Noam Ohana’s Israeli Consulate advisory role (consistent with venture press but not confirmed against foreign ministry records)

Open questions requiring resolution:

1. SIBAT and Who Profits live database search — Direct queries of both databases should be conducted to confirm no Ferrari entry exists beyond training data coverage
2. Auto Italia IL Ltd. current ownership — The 2014 Kardan/Alon transaction is the most recent confirmed record; current beneficial ownership requires verification against Israeli Companies Registrar
3. Post-ransomware IR vendor identity — The identity of Ferrari’s March 2023 breach remediation vendors has not been publicly disclosed; an Israeli-origin vendor cannot be ruled out from public sources
4. Ferrari-specific Israel revenue — No public source disaggregates Ferrari’s Israel revenue from broader regional buckets; this gap is structural and unlikely to be resolved through public sources alone
5. Full Exor Ventures Israeli portfolio — Exor annual reports do not provide investment-by-investment disclosure; the complete portfolio cannot be confirmed from public filings
6. Elkann/Appeal of Conscience speech — Specific year, text, and Yad Vashem reference in prior AI research require verification against Appeal of Conscience Foundation records before reliance

Recommended Actions

For researchers and civil society organisations (score confidence: high): Conduct live searches of the Who Profits database and SIBAT registered supplier directories specifically for Ferrari N.V., Ferrari S.p.A., and Ferrari Group entries before publication or citation of this dossier. The training-data-based search is comprehensive but cannot substitute for a live query of databases maintained on a rolling basis.

For ethical procurement and investment screening (score confidence: high): Ferrari’s Tier E (125) score indicates no material direct involvement in Israeli military contracting, settlement construction, surveillance infrastructure, or active political advocacy. Standard ethical investment screens applicable to companies at this tier — monitoring for changes in direct contracting, franchisee ownership, or explicit advocacy — are appropriate. Divestment triggers at the Ferrari N.V. level would require confirmation of at least one of the open questions identified above (direct IDF contract, confirmed Israeli-origin digital vendor at material scale, or confirmed IDF prime contractor in Exor Ventures portfolio).

For BDS campaign prioritisation (score confidence: high): The scoring does not support Ferrari as a primary campaign target given the absence of direct defence contracting, settlement infrastructure involvement, or material digital provision to Israeli state bodies. The most factually grounded advocacy angle — if pursued — would be the documented Ukraine/Gaza communications asymmetry, specifically calling on CEO Vigna to issue a comparable humanitarian statement and donation for Gaza as was issued for Ukraine. This is a public-facing, evidence-grounded ask tied to Ferrari’s own established precedent.³⁴

For Ferrari N.V. governance and sustainability functions (score confidence: high): The documented communications asymmetry creates reputational risk that Ferrari’s own precedents make difficult to defend. A governance response that brings Ferrari’s Gaza communications posture into alignment with its Ukraine precedent — a CEO humanitarian statement, a named donation, and a named delivery mechanism — would be both consistent with established practice and responsive to documented civil society expectations. No recommendation is made regarding market suspension, which would require a more direct operational nexus than is documented here.

For ongoing monitoring (score confidence: moderate): The Exor Ventures Israeli portfolio warrants monitoring for new investments in companies with confirmed IDF prime contracts. The Samelet/Eltel downstream chain should be revisited if Eltel’s vehicle maintenance scope expands to include any Ferrari-brand vehicles. The AWS/Project Nimbus adjacency should be reviewed if public disclosures establish that Ferrari’s workloads are specifically deployed on Project Nimbus infrastructure.

End Notes