V-MIL Domain Audit: Gucci

Audit Phase: V-MIL (Military Forensics) Target Company: Gucci (subsidiary of Kering Group) Audit Date: 2026-05-01

Direct Defence Contracting & Procurement

No public evidence identified of any contractual or procurement relationship between Gucci and Israeli defence or security institutions.

• Israeli Ministry of Defence (IMOD) & IDF: No verified contracts, tender awards, framework agreements, or memoranda of understanding between Gucci and the IMOD, the Israel Defence Forces (IDF), the Israel Prison Service, or the Israel Border Police were identified across any search query or training-data review. No relevant entries were surfaced in IMOD-adjacent procurement records or official government announcements.¹
• SIBAT (Defence Export & Cooperation Directorate): No listing of Gucci in SIBAT export directories, international defence exhibition catalogues, or Israeli state procurement registries was returned.¹ It is noted that SIBAT does not maintain a publicly searchable open-access supplier database; direct submission via official records request to IMOD/SIBAT would be required to rule out any incidental registration categorically.²
• Israeli Government Procurement Administration (GPA): Individual tender records are published in Hebrew on the Israeli government procurement portal (mr.gov.il). No automated search was able to retrieve Gucci or Kering Group entries. A manual Hebrew-language search of the GPA portal is recommended before a definitive negative determination is entered for this sub-category.²
• Press Releases & Official Announcements: No corporate press releases, government announcements, or trade press reports detailing any defence cooperation or procurement engagement between Gucci and Israeli security entities were identified.

Dual-Use Products & Tactical Variants

No public evidence identified of dual-use or militarised product lines connected to Israeli security end-users.

• Commercial Product Range: Gucci’s publicly documented commercial portfolio consists of luxury fashion and ready-to-wear, leather goods, footwear, accessories, fragrances, and eyewear.¹ No ruggedised, tactical, mil-spec, or defence-grade product variants appear in any Gucci or Kering Group product catalogue, corporate filing, or trade publication.
• Civilian-to-Military Conversion Pathway: Not applicable on current evidence. The product categories in which Gucci operates (high-end textiles, leather goods, accessories) do not fall within conventional dual-use classification schedules covering optical systems, electronics, propulsion, guidance, communications, or armour materials. No evidence of an Israeli authority classifying any Gucci product as dual-use was identified.
• End-User Certification & Export Licensing: No export licence applications, end-user certificates, or government export control reviews related to Gucci sales to Israeli defence or security end-users were identified in any jurisdiction.³

Heavy Machinery, Construction & Infrastructure

No public evidence identified of any Gucci involvement in construction, engineering, or infrastructure activity in Israel or the occupied territories.

• Absence of Manufacturing Capability: Gucci does not manufacture or supply heavy machinery, construction equipment, or engineering vehicles. This domain section is structurally inapplicable to the company’s documented commercial activities.¹
• Occupied Territory Infrastructure: No NGO investigation, UN documentation, or photographic or testimonial evidence places Gucci-branded or Gucci-supplied equipment in West Bank settlements, along the separation barrier, at military installations, or elsewhere in the occupied Palestinian territory.⁴⁵⁶
• Construction & Engineering Contracts: No construction, engineering, or infrastructure contracting activity by Gucci or Kering Group in Israel or the occupied territories was identified in any public filing, corporate disclosure, or civil society report.⁷

Supply Chain Integration with Defence Primes

No public evidence identified of any supply relationship between Gucci and Israeli defence prime contractors.

• Israeli Defence Primes: No verified supply relationship between Gucci and Elbit Systems, Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, or IMI/Elbit Land Systems was returned by any search query or identified in training data.⁸
• Component Category Overlap: Not applicable on current evidence. Gucci’s manufacturing base is documented as centred on luxury textile, leather, and accessory production. There is no known overlap with defence sub-system component categories including optical, electronic, propulsion, guidance, communication, or armour systems.¹
• Joint Development & Co-Production: No joint development agreements, co-production arrangements, or licensed manufacturing relationships with Israeli defence primes were identified.
• Kering Group Supply Chain Disclosures: Kering’s annual sustainability and CSR reporting discloses supply chain data oriented toward environmental and labour criteria. A full review of Kering’s Document d’Enregistrement Universel (filed with the French AMF) for the years 2019–2024 for any Israeli defence-sector disclosures was not completable via automated search and is recommended as a targeted follow-up.¹

Logistical Sustainment & Base Services

No public evidence identified of any Gucci or Kering Group involvement in military logistics, base services, or defence-related supply chain operations in Israel.

• Service Contracts to Military Installations: No verified contracts for catering, transport, fuel, waste management, facilities maintenance, or telecommunications services to IDF bases, detention centres, or Israeli security installations were identified.²
• Shipping, Freight & Port Services: No verified shipping or freight contracts specifically servicing Israeli defence logistics or military cargo were returned. Gucci’s known logistics operations are commercial retail supply chain in nature and oriented toward consumer markets.¹
• Secondary Market & Distributor Channels: Even absent direct defence contracts, authorised distributors or franchisees operating in Israel could theoretically supply Gucci-branded goods to Israeli state employees through civilian procurement channels. No evidence of any formalised state procurement through this route was identified. However, this channel is structurally unverifiable without distributor-level disclosure and is flagged as an evidence gap requiring targeted investigation.⁷

Munitions, Weapons Systems & Strategic Platforms

No public evidence identified of any Gucci role in the manufacture, supply, or development of lethal systems or strategic platforms.

• Prime Contractor Status: No public evidence identified. Gucci has no documented role as a prime contractor or licensed manufacturer of any lethal platform — small arms, artillery, armoured vehicles, tactical drones, naval vessels, or other weapons systems — supplied to any end-user, including Israeli forces.⁸
• Munitions & Precursor Materials: No public evidence identified. Gucci’s documented raw material inputs (textiles, hides, metals used in accessories, fragrance compounds) are not identified as munitions precursors or controlled substances under relevant export control schedules.³
• Strategic & Existential Defence Programmes: No public evidence identified. No verified role in Iron Dome, David’s Sling, Arrow, F-35 programme supply chain, main battle tank programmes, warship construction, or ballistic missile programmes was returned for Gucci or Kering Group.⁸
• Sub-System & Critical Component Supply: No public evidence identified. The structural inapplicability of Gucci’s product categories to weapons sub-systems is consistent across all search returns and training data.

Export Licensing, Regulatory & Legal History

No public evidence identified of any export licensing proceedings, regulatory enforcement actions, or legal proceedings connecting Gucci to Israeli defence or security end-users.

• Export Licence Decisions: No government decisions to grant, deny, suspend, or revoke export licences for Gucci products to Israeli military or security end-users were identified in any jurisdiction, including the UK (SPIRE/ECJU), the EU (dual-use regulation framework), or the US (BIS/SNAP-R).³ It is noted that these licensing systems are not fully open-access; absence of identified records does not constitute a confirmed negative without direct agency inquiry.
• Arms Embargo & Sanctions Compliance: No investigations, citations, or enforcement actions related to Gucci’s compliance with arms embargoes, export control regimes, or sanctions affecting defence trade with Israel were returned in any jurisdiction.³
• Legal Challenges & Judicial Review: No public evidence identified. No court proceedings, administrative review processes, or parliamentary inquiries specifically concerning Gucci’s export activity to Israeli defence or security end-users were identified in any jurisdiction reviewed.⁶

Civil Society Scrutiny & Documented Investigations

No public evidence identified of civil society documentation specifically connecting Gucci to Israeli defence sector activity.

• NGO & Academic Reports: A search of Who Profits, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, AFSC, and Corporate Occupation published databases and reports returned no findings naming Gucci in the context of military, security, or dual-use supply chain relationships with the Israeli state.⁹⁴⁵ The Who Profits research centre maintains a dedicated database tracking corporate involvement in the Israeli occupation economy; direct access to full company profiles for “Gucci” and “Kering” was not retrievable via automated search and is recommended as a follow-up step.⁹
• UN Human Rights Council & Special Procedures: No Special Rapporteur reports, UN Human Rights Council resolutions, or OHCHR database entries naming Gucci in connection with Israeli defence or occupation-economy supply chain activity were identified.⁶
• Boycott, Divestment & Sanctions (BDS) Campaigns: No public evidence identified of Gucci appearing in documented BDS Movement target lists, institutional divestment decisions, or organised exclusion campaigns specifically grounded in defence supply chain activity.¹⁰ It is noted for completeness that Gucci and parent company Kering have been subject to separate BDS-adjacent consumer campaigns arising from their commercial retail presence in Israel (i.e., operating physical stores within Israel as a retail market).⁷¹⁰ No such campaign reviewed was grounded in defence-sector supply chain activity; this retail market presence falls outside the scope of the V-MIL domain and is recorded here solely to distinguish it from the subject matter of this audit section.
• Corporate Response & Policy Statements: No public evidence identified. No Gucci or Kering Group public statements, policy changes, contract terminations, end-use monitoring commitments, or supply chain reviews specifically related to a defence supply chain relationship with Israel were returned.¹⁷
• Academic Literature: No peer-reviewed academic studies (sourced via JSTOR, SSRN, or equivalent) specifically examining Gucci’s or Kering Group’s role in the Israeli occupation economy in a defence-industrial context were identified.

End Notes