INDEX / DIRECTORY / HUAWEI / V-MIL

Huawei V-MIL

MILITARY AUDIT UPDATED 2026-06-01
V-MIL Score 0.37 /10 C Huawei — BDS-1000 464
V-MIL 0.37

Evidence-only forensic audit. Scoring happens downstream — see the main dossier for the composite assessment.

Huawei V-MIL Audit — Domain Audit Report

Direct Defence Contracting & Procurement

No public evidence has been identified of any direct contract, tender award, framework agreement, or memorandum of understanding between Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. (or Huawei Israel Ltd. / Toga Networks) and the Israeli Ministry of Defence (IMOD), Israel Defence Forces (IDF), Israel Prison Service, or Israel Border Police 123.

No record has been identified in SIBAT (Israel’s Defence Export and Defence Cooperation Directorate) listings of Huawei as a registered defence partner, approved defence supplier, or defence export-registered entity 1.

Huawei operates in Israel through two documented subsidiaries: Toga Networks Ltd. (an R&D center founded in 2009, becoming a Huawei development center in 2010) and HexaTier Ltd. (a database security company acquired in December 2016). Both entities are focused on civilian telecommunications and enterprise technology 456.

Toga Networks board composition includes Directors Shaowei Liu, Zhiliang Gao, and Long Jiping — all Chinese nationals with no documented Israeli defence-industry affiliations 7.

Israeli 5G tender (concluded August 2020) awarded licenses to Partner/HOT Mobile, Cellcom, and Pelephone using Nokia and Ericsson infrastructure. Huawei was excluded from participation, and the likelihood of Chinese technology in Israeli 5G was described as “slim to none” by INSS analysis 18.

Israeli government excluded Huawei from participation in Israel’s 5G mobile network tender, a decision formalised in 2021-2022 under pressure from US government security representations 19.

Dual-Use Products & Tactical Variants

No public evidence has been identified that Huawei manufactures or markets ruggedised, mil-spec, or tactical variants of its products specifically marketed to Israeli security forces 23.

No documented end-use certificates, end-user undertakings, or government export control reviews have been identified specifically in connection with Huawei sales to Israeli defence or security end-users 10.

Huawei is placed on the US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) Entity List (effective May 2019, maintained and updated through the audit period). This designation restricts US-origin technology from being supplied to Huawei globally and is driven by US national security concerns, not Israel-specific considerations 10.

Toga Networks was added to the US Entity List in August 2020 in the third round of listings covering 38 Huawei affiliates in 21 countries including Israel. The license review policy for Toga Networks is “presumption of denial” 10.

Huawei has been actively recruiting Israeli software engineers with exploit research and offensive cyber capabilities, as reported by Haaretz in July 2025. The specific projects or end-users for these recruits were not identified 11.

Heavy Machinery, Construction & Infrastructure

No photographic evidence, NGO field investigation, or UN documentation has been identified placing Huawei-branded heavy machinery, construction vehicles, or earth-moving equipment in settlement construction, the construction of the separation barrier, or military installation construction 1213.

No public evidence has been identified of Huawei contracts for construction, maintenance, servicing, or expansion of checkpoints, detention facilities, military bases, or the separation barrier 1.

Palestinian telecom operator Paltel Group’s network infrastructure upgrades use Juniper Networks equipment, not Huawei. Israeli military Civil Administration approved Paltel’s request in October 2022 to import circuit boards for West Bank coverage improvements 14.

Supply Chain Integration with Defence Primes

No public evidence has been identified of a verified supply relationship between Huawei and any of Israel’s primary defence manufacturers — Elbit Systems Ltd., Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, or Israel Military Industries (IMI/Elbit Land) 1.

No joint development programmes, co-production agreements, technology transfer arrangements, or licensed manufacturing agreements between Huawei and Israeli defence firms have been publicly documented 1.

Annual reports and publicly available supplier disclosures from Elbit Systems, IAI, and Rafael do not reference Huawei as a supplier of components, sub-systems, or materials of any category 1.

UN A/HRC/59/23 (Special Rapporteur Francesca Albanese, July 2025) paragraphs 28-47 on military, surveillance/carcerality, and civilian heavy machinery do not name Huawei as a defence supply chain actor 15.

Logistical Sustainment & Base Services

No public evidence has been identified of Huawei holding contracts to provide catering, transport, fuel supply, waste management, facilities maintenance, telecommunications services, or other logistical support services directly to IDF bases, military training facilities, detention centres, or Israeli security installations 123.

No public evidence has been identified of Huawei service contracts scoped to military or security installations in the West Bank, Golan Heights, East Jerusalem, or the Negev 1.

No defence-logistics nexus — including shipping, freight forwarding, or port handling contracts specifically servicing Israeli defence logistics, military cargo, or arms shipments — has been documented 1.

Munitions, Weapons Systems & Strategic Platforms

No public evidence has been identified of Huawei acting as a prime contractor, licensed manufacturer, sub-system supplier, or component supplier in relation to any lethal platform supplied to Israeli forces, including small arms, artillery, armoured vehicles, tactical drones, or naval vessels 1.

No public evidence has been identified of Huawei supplying ammunition, explosive ordnance, chemical propellants, warhead components, or munitions precursor materials to Israeli defence end-users 1.

No public evidence has been identified of Huawei involvement in any of Israel’s strategic or existential defence systems (Iron Dome, David’s Sling, Arrow, F-35I Adir, Merkava battle tanks, Israeli Navy vessels, ballistic missile systems) 1.

No public evidence has been identified of Huawei supplying guidance electronics, fire-control systems, radar components, propulsion units, or warhead casings specifically calibrated for Israeli lethal or strategic weapons systems 1.

PAX “Companies Arming Israel and Their Financiers” report (June 2024) does not list Huawei as an arms producer selling to Israel 16.

Export Licensing, Regulatory & Legal History

Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. was designated on the US BIS Entity List in May 2019. This designation has been updated and maintained through the audit period and restricts US-origin technology from being supplied to Huawei globally. This action is driven by US national security concerns and is not Israel-specific 10.

Toga Networks was added to the US Entity List in August 2020. License review policy “presumption of denial” applies to exports from the US to Toga Networks 10.

The Israeli government excluded Huawei (along with ZTE) from participation in Israel’s 5G mobile network tender, a decision formalised in 2021-2022 under pressure from US government security representations. This is a national security-driven regulatory action concerning civilian communications networks, not an arms control or defence procurement enforcement action 19.

Legal proceedings: Electra Consumer Products (1993) Ltd. filed a NIS 80 million lawsuit against Huawei in March 2018 related to a failed exclusive distribution agreement for consumer electronics in Israel and the Palestinian Authority. The dispute involved a civilian commercial distribution relationship, not defence contracts 5.

Civil Society Scrutiny & Documented Investigations

The UN OHCHR database of business enterprises involved in Israeli settlements (updated September 2025 to list 158 business enterprises from 11 countries) does not include Huawei 1718.

Who Profits Research Center maintains a database entry for Huawei (updated through 2023). The entry documents Huawei as a telecommunications infrastructure supplier. The basis of any listing would be civilian telecom infrastructure with territorial coverage implications through indirect channels, not direct military supply or direct defence contracting 1213.

PAX “Companies Arming Israel and Their Financiers” report (June 2024) does not list Huawei as an arms producer selling to Israel 1619.

No organised boycott, divestment, or exclusion campaign specifically targeting Huawei for Israeli defence sector activities has been publicly documented 13.

Huawei faces separate, non-Israel-related divestment and exclusion pressures in Western markets driven by espionage concerns and US government designations 110.

No public statements, policy changes, contract terminations, or end-use monitoring commitments by Huawei specifically in response to civil society pressure regarding Israeli defence or settlement supply chain activity have been identified 23.

No public evidence identified — comprehensive carrier procurement archives from 2000-2018 were not exhaustively searched for historical Huawei equipment in West Bank settlements.

No public evidence identified — Toga Networks patent portfolio (90-100 patents annually per Globes reports) was not verified for defence-adjacent patents in this audit.

No public evidence identified — HexaTier deployment in Israeli government networks was not confirmed despite its acquisition for cloud database security in 2016.

No public evidence identified — complete Israeli subsidiary corporate structure beyond Toga Networks and HexaTier was not verified through full corporate registry access.

No public evidence identified — controlling principals’ defence-industry affiliations beyond well-documented Ren Zhengfei and Huawei headquarters board backgrounds were not verified for specific Israeli subsidiary board ties.

No public evidence identified — defence prime Tier 2 and Tier 3 supplier data is not publicly disclosed in sufficient granularity to definitively rule out indirect Huawei components embedded within systems integration supply chains.

End Notes

Footnotes

  1. https://www.inss.org.il/publication/the-world-against-huawei ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14 ↩15 ↩16 ↩17

  2. https://www.huawei.com/en/annual-report/2023 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  3. https://www.huawei.com/en/annual-report/2022 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  4. https://toganetworks.com ↩

  5. https://nocamels.com/2016/12/huawei-acquires-israeli-database-security-startup-hexatier/ ↩ ↩2

  6. https://www.lightreading.com/telco-cloud/carriers/software-defined-networking/d/orouters/768942 ↩

  7. https://en.checkid.co.il/company/TOGA+NETWORKS+LTD-LOxPg9O-514226463 ↩

  8. https://www.lightreading.com/broadband/partner-communications-picks-adtran-for-multigigabit-fiber-broadband-services-in-israel ↩

  9. https://www.reuters.com ↩ ↩2

  10. https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-15/subtitle-B/chapter-VII/subchapter-C/part-744/appendix-Supplement%20No.%204%20to%20Part%20744 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6

  11. https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/security-aviation/2025-07-31/ty-article/.premium/u-s-sanctioned-chinese-tech-giant-huawei-headhunts-israeli-hackers/00000198-6013-dc50-a9bf-ed73c97f0000 ↩

  12. https://www.whoprofits.org/writable/uploads/old/uploads/2018/09/SIGNAL-STRENGTH-OCCUPIED-THE-TELECOMMUNICATIONS-SECTOR-AND-THE-ISRAELI-OCCUPATION-1-1.pdf ↩ ↩2

  13. https://whoprofits.org/company/huawei/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  14. https://developingtelecoms.com/telecom-technology/wireless-networks/12074-palestinian-operator-announces-network-infrastructure-upgrades.html ↩

  15. https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/regular-sessions/session59/archives ↩

  16. https://paxforpeace.nl/publications/the-companies-arming-israel-and-their-financiers ↩ ↩2

  17. https://www.ohchr.org/en/business/bhr-database ↩

  18. https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/sessions-regular/session31/database-hrc3136/A_HRC_43_71.pdf ↩

  19. https://whoprofits.org/company/huawei/ ↩