INDEX / DIRECTORY / MAYBELLINE / V-MIL

Maybelline V-MIL

MILITARY AUDIT UPDATED 2026-05-19
V-MIL Score 0.00 /10 E Maybelline — BDS-1000 162
V-MIL 0.00

Evidence-only forensic audit. Scoring happens downstream — see the main dossier for the composite assessment.

V-MIL Domain Audit: Maybelline (Maybelline New York / L’Oréal Group)

Audit Phase: V-MIL (Military Forensics) Research Date: 2026-05-01 Prepared by: Domain Audit Unit

Direct Defence Contracting & Procurement

No public evidence identified.

A review of the Israeli Government Procurement Portal (Mekome)1, SIBAT’s publicly accessible export and defence cooperation directory2, and publicly available IDF logistics and quartermaster procurement records yields no documented contracts, tender awards, framework agreements, or memoranda of understanding between Maybelline New York, its parent brand L’Oréal, or any L’Oréal Group subsidiary and the Israeli Ministry of Defence, the Israel Defence Forces, the Israel Prison Service, or the Israel Border Police. This assessment draws on L’Oréal’s own corporate financial disclosures — the Universal Registration Documents for 2022 and 2023 — which contain no reference to any defence ministry engagement, defence-sector revenue stream, or government security-sector client in Israel or elsewhere.34

Maybelline and L’Oréal do not appear in the SIBAT defence export directorate listings2, in international defence exhibition catalogues (ISDEF, Eurosatory, DSEI participant lists), or in any Israeli or international defence procurement registry in connection with Israeli state defence contracts. No corporate press releases from L’Oréal or Maybelline, and no Israeli government announcements, reference defence cooperation, joint ventures, or partnership agreements with any Israeli defence entity.34

Evidence note: The Israeli tender database (Mekome) is not fully indexed in English-language open-source databases; Hebrew-language records were not directly queried via live access during this audit. Separately, SIBAT’s full export-cooperation directory is not entirely public, and classified or restricted sections remain inaccessible. The finding of absence is therefore limited to the publicly accessible portions of both databases.21

Dual-Use Products & Tactical Variants

No public evidence identified.

Maybelline’s product portfolio consists entirely of mass-market cosmetics — foundation, mascara, lipstick, eye shadow, skincare, and related beauty products.5 No ruggedised, tactical, mil-spec, or defence-grade variants of any Maybelline product line have been publicly marketed, listed in defence procurement catalogues, or confirmed sold to any Israeli security force. A review of the Maybelline brand’s official product catalogue5 and L’Oréal’s annual reports34 identifies no product category with a plausible dual-use military application. The company’s core manufacturing is confined to cosmetic formulations and associated packaging.

On the question of end-user certification and export licensing: no export licence applications, end-user certificates, or government export control reviews related to Maybelline or L’Oréal sales to Israeli defence or security end-users have been identified in publicly available US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) records6, UK strategic export controls licensing data7, or EU dual-use export records. Cosmetic preparations do not fall within the scheduled goods of standard dual-use or munitions control regimes (EU Regulation 2021/821, US EAR/ITAR, or the UK Export Control Order 2008), making formal licensing requirements inapplicable to this product range under normal commercial conditions.67

Heavy Machinery, Construction & Infrastructure

No public evidence identified.

Maybelline is a cosmetics brand and does not manufacture, market, or sell heavy machinery, construction equipment, engineering vehicles, or industrial plant. No NGO reports8910, UN documentation1112, or photographic or satellite evidence has been identified linking Maybelline or L’Oréal equipment to construction, maintenance, or demolition activity in Israeli settlements, along the separation barrier, at military installations, or elsewhere in occupied territories.

The Who Profits Research Center database8, the AFSC Investigate database13, the Corporate Occupation Project14, OCHA documentation11, and the UN Human Rights Council settlement database (A/HRC/43/71)12 were all reviewed as source classes. None document L’Oréal or Maybelline in any capacity relating to construction or engineering activity in the occupied Palestinian territories or in connection with settlement infrastructure. No contracts for construction, maintenance, servicing, or expansion of checkpoints, detention facilities, military bases, the separation barrier, or settlement infrastructure involving either entity have been identified through the Israeli procurement portal1 or any civil-society monitoring body.81314

Supply Chain Integration with Defence Primes

No public evidence identified.

No verified supply relationship has been identified in which Maybelline or L’Oréal provides components, sub-systems, raw materials, or specialist manufacturing services to Israeli defence prime contractors — including Elbit Systems, Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, or Israel Military Industries/Elbit Land. Maybelline’s primary inputs are cosmetic raw materials (pigments, emollients, waxes, preservatives, and polymers); none of these have been identified in available records as inputs procured by Israeli defence primes from L’Oréal or Maybelline.34

No joint development programmes, co-production agreements, technology transfer arrangements, or licensed manufacturing agreements between Maybelline/L’Oréal and any Israeli defence firm have been identified. A review of L’Oréal’s R&D partnership disclosures315 and Israeli defence industry press yields no evidence of such arrangements. Supplier disclosures from Elbit Systems, IAI, and Rafael do not reference L’Oréal or any L’Oréal subsidiary.

Evidence gap: L’Oréal’s third- and fourth-tier suppliers in Israel are not publicly disclosed in granular detail. It is not possible to rule out incidental commercial supply at sub-tier levels to Israeli state-adjacent entities solely from public records. This gap does not constitute evidence of a supply relationship; it reflects the inherent limitation of open-source supply chain visibility.

Logistical Sustainment & Base Services

No public evidence identified.

Maybelline and L’Oréal are not identified in any verified record as providers of catering, transport, fuel supply, waste management, facilities maintenance, telecommunications, or other support services to IDF bases, military training facilities, detention centres, or security installations. Source classes reviewed include the Israeli Ministry of Defence procurement portal1, IDF base services tender records, and L’Oréal’s corporate disclosures.34

L’Oréal operates commercial distribution logistics to Israel for civilian consumer goods through its Israeli operations.3 No evidence distinguishes or links this commercial logistics activity to defence cargo, military-priority shipping, or base services. No verified shipping, freight forwarding, or port handling contracts specifically servicing Israeli defence logistics or military cargo involving Maybelline or L’Oréal have been identified through Israeli port authority records (Ashdod, Haifa) or defence freight directories.

Munitions, Weapons Systems & Strategic Platforms

No public evidence identified.

Maybelline does not manufacture, and has no publicly documented role as prime contractor or licensed manufacturer of, any small arms, artillery systems, armoured vehicles, tactical drones, naval vessels, or other lethal platforms. This is confirmed by the absence of any Maybelline or L’Oréal reference in the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database16, Jane’s defence industry directories, the SIBAT export directorate2, or the Israeli Ministry of Defence procurement system.1

No verified supply of ammunition, explosive ordnance, chemical propellants, warhead components, or munitions precursor materials to any Israeli defence end-user involving Maybelline or L’Oréal has been identified. While L’Oréal uses certain industrial chemicals in cosmetic formulation, none have been identified in available records — including SIPRI data16 or BIS enforcement records6 — as controlled munitions precursors supplied to Israeli defence users.

No role by Maybelline or L’Oréal in the manufacture, integration, maintenance, or supply of components for Iron Dome, David’s Sling, Arrow missile defence, fighter aircraft, main battle tanks, warships, or ballistic missile systems has been identified. Supplier disclosures from Rafael, IAI, and Elbit — the prime contractors for these systems — do not reference L’Oréal or any L’Oréal subsidiary.162

Export Licensing, Regulatory & Legal History

No public evidence identified.

No publicly known government decision to grant, deny, suspend, or revoke an export licence for Maybelline or L’Oréal products to Israeli military or security end-users has been identified in any jurisdiction. Source classes reviewed include US BIS enforcement records6, the UK strategic export controls licensing database7, EU dual-use export control reports, and Israeli export licensing disclosures. As noted under Dual-Use Products above, cosmetics do not fall within the scheduled goods of major export control regimes, rendering formal licensing requirements inapplicable in standard commercial practice.67

No investigations, citations, or enforcement actions relating to Maybelline or L’Oréal and arms embargo compliance, export control regimes, or sanctions affecting defence trade with Israel have been identified. The SIPRI multilateral embargo database17 records no embargo instruments applicable to a cosmetics supply relationship between L’Oréal and Israel. No court proceedings, judicial reviews, or legal challenges brought against Maybelline, L’Oréal, or any government regarding a defence supply relationship between these entities and Israel have been identified through court record databases or Reuters’ legal news archive.17

Civil Society Scrutiny & Documented Investigations

NGO and Academic Documentation

The Who Profits Research Center8 maintains a database of companies operating in Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories. L’Oréal appears in Who Profits’ database in connection with its civilian commercial operations in Israel — specifically the maintenance of manufacturing and distribution infrastructure within Israel proper — but Who Profits does not, in its publicly available profile, document L’Oréal or Maybelline in a military, weapons, or defence supply capacity. The basis cited by Who Profits is commercial presence and tax revenue generation, not defence contracting.8

The AFSC Investigate database13 similarly documents L’Oréal’s commercial presence and revenue flows in Israel but does not identify a military or defence supply relationship specific to Maybelline.13

The UN Human Rights Council database (A/HRC/43/71)12, published in February 2020, lists 112 business enterprises with activities in Israeli settlements. L’Oréal and Maybelline do not appear on this list.12 It should be noted that this database has not been formally updated since 2020; post-2020 corporate activity in settlements is therefore not reflected in this source. Amnesty International9 and Human Rights Watch10 have both published documentation on corporate accountability in Israeli-occupied territories; neither organisation’s publicly available materials identify Maybelline or L’Oréal in a defence or weapons supply context.910

No academic peer-reviewed study specifically addressing Maybelline’s or L’Oréal’s military or defence supply chain relationship with the Israeli state has been identified.

Boycott and Divestment Campaigns

The BDS Movement includes L’Oréal — and by extension Maybelline as an L’Oréal brand — among companies targeted for boycott.1819 The publicly cited grounds are L’Oréal’s commercial operations in Israel, including its manufacturing plant in Migdal HaEmek (located in northern Israel proper, not in a recognised occupied territory), revenue generation supporting the Israeli economy, and general commercial normalisation.1819 The BDS campaign documentation does not cite documented defence contracting, weapons supply, or military logistics as grounds for targeting L’Oréal or Maybelline.1819

Ethical Consumer rates Maybelline/L’Oréal negatively in part due to Israeli operations, again citing commercial presence rather than military supply.20 Good On You’s brand rating for Maybelline addresses environmental and labour concerns but does not identify defence supply chain issues.21

No institutional divestment decisions by pension funds or sovereign wealth funds specifically citing Maybelline’s or L’Oréal’s defence sector activities — as opposed to general Israel-related commercial operations — have been identified through major pension fund ESG databases, the Norwegian Government Pension Fund exclusion list, or UNPRI signatory exclusion records.

No organised boycott or divestment campaign specifically targeting Maybelline on V-MIL grounds (i.e., defence contracting, weapons supply, or military logistics) has been identified. All documented boycott activity is grounded in general commercial presence in Israel.181920

Corporate Policy and Response

L’Oréal has issued general statements through its L’Oréal for the Future sustainability framework15 and UN Global Compact participation22 affirming commitments to human rights due diligence aligned with the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. These statements are not specific to Israeli defence supply, consistent with the absence of any identified defence supply relationship.1522 No specific policy change, contract termination, or end-use monitoring commitment by L’Oréal or Maybelline in response to civil society pressure regarding defence supply chain activities involving Israel has been identified.19

Evidence Gaps and Methodological Limitations

The following gaps are noted as constraints on the completeness of this audit, not as indicators of undiscovered relationships:

End Notes

Footnotes

  1. https://www.mr.gov.il/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6

  2. https://www.mod.gov.il/Defence_Missions/SIBAT/Pages/default.aspx ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6

  3. https://www.loreal-finance.com/en/annual-report-2023/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8

  4. https://www.loreal-finance.com/en/annual-report-2022/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5

  5. https://www.maybelline.com/about-us ↩ ↩2

  6. https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/enforcement/oee ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5

  7. https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/strategic-export-controls-licensing-data ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  8. https://www.whoprofits.org/companies/company/loreal ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6

  9. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2023/10/corporate-accountability-israel-occupied-territories/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  10. https://www.hrw.org/tag/israel-and-palestine ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  11. https://www.ochaopt.org/ ↩ ↩2

  12. https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/regular-sessions/session43/list-reports ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5

  13. https://investigate.afsc.org/company/loreal ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  14. https://www.corporateoccupation.org/ ↩ ↩2

  15. https://www.loreal.com/en/commitments-and-responsibilities/for-the-future/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  16. https://armstransfers.sipri.org/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  17. https://www.sipri.org/databases/embargoes ↩ ↩2

  18. https://bdsmovement.net/Act-Now-Against-These-Companies-and-Products ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  19. https://bdsmovement.net/loreal ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5

  20. https://www.ethicalconsumer.org/company-profile/loreal ↩ ↩2

  21. https://goodonyou.eco/brand/maybelline ↩

  22. https://unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/participants/92-loreal ↩ ↩2