INDEX / DIRECTORY / SAMSUNG / V-MIL

Samsung V-MIL

MILITARY AUDIT UPDATED 2026-05-27
V-MIL Score 0.75 /10 C Samsung — BDS-1000 590
V-MIL 0.75

Evidence-only forensic audit. Scoring happens downstream — see the main dossier for the composite assessment.

V-MIL Audit: Samsung

Direct Defence Contracting & Procurement

Israel Defense reported in December 2019 that the Galaxy Tab Active 2 had been “assimilated by various branches of the IDF” following a comprehensive requirements collection process involving Israeli clients, with the Tab Active Pro subsequently reported as “under evaluation by various defense and emergency agencies in Israel” 1. No formal contract documents, tender awards, memoranda of understanding, or framework agreements between Samsung Electronics (or any Samsung subsidiary) and the Israeli Ministry of Defense, IDF, Israel Prison Service, or Israel Border Police have been identified in publicly available procurement registries, corporate filings, or official government announcements 12. Samsung is not listed as a registered supplier in the SIBAT (Israel’s Defence Export and Defence Cooperation Directorate) official export directory based on publicly available information 1.

No new public evidence has been identified confirming, extending, or terminating any Samsung Electronics supply relationship with the IDF or Israeli Ministry of Defense following the ICJ Advisory Opinion of July 2024 or the ICC arrest warrants of November 2024, and Samsung has issued no statement acknowledging, affirming, or terminating IDF supply relationships in this period 3.

Samsung issued a press release in August 2024 announcing the Galaxy Tab Active5 Tactical Edition, describing the device as “designed for military operations” with features including Android Tactical Assault Kit (ATAK) support, stealth mode, and NVG-compatible display, though the release does not name Israel or the IDF as a customer 4. Samsung has published Insights articles stating Tactical Edition devices are “trusted by military forces and government bodies worldwide,” without naming specific national customers 4.

Dual-Use Products & Tactical Variants

Samsung manufactures and markets the Galaxy Tab Active series (Active 2, Active 3, Active Pro, Active5) as ruggedised, MIL-STD-810H-certified, IP68-rated tablets marketed across defence, government, utilities, and industrial sectors 4. The Tactical Edition suite (Galaxy S20 TE, Galaxy S23 TE, Galaxy XCover6 Pro TE, Galaxy Tab Active5 TE) is purpose-configured for military use with documented specifications including: Stealth Mode (hardware-level disabling of all RF emissions), NVG-compatible display mode, ATAK optimisation, multi-ethernet connectivity, DualDAR encryption meeting NSA CSfC requirements, and programmable PTT keys 4. Samsung Knox is marketed as “defense-grade” and is certified to NSA Commercial Solutions for Classified (CSfC) standards, listed on the NSA CSfC Components List through 2024 4.

The Tab Active series is commercially available through Samsung’s business channel and general retail distributors and is not exclusively sold to military customers 14. Tactical Edition devices differ in that their firmware and hardware modifications — stealth mode, NVG driver stack, DualDAR encryption layer, and ATAK optimisation — are purpose-built for military operational environments with no significant civilian application 4. No public evidence has been identified of any export licence application, end-user certificate, or government export control review specifically related to Samsung device sales to Israeli defence or security end-users 12.

Heavy Machinery, Construction & Infrastructure

Samsung Electronics is a manufacturer of consumer electronics and semiconductors, not heavy construction machinery, with the relevant Samsung subsidiary for construction activities being Samsung C&T Corporation 1. No verified NGO investigation, UN documentation, photographic evidence, or official report has been identified specifically documenting Samsung C&T equipment being used in Israeli settlement construction, the separation barrier, military installations, or occupied territory infrastructure 1. Samsung C&T does not appear in Who Profits’ database as a profiled company in connection with occupied territory construction 25.

Israeli business publications reported in 2023-2024 that NTA (Metropolitan Mass Transit System) delegations had courted South Korean contractors including Samsung C&T for the Tel Aviv Metro project (estimated at approximately NIS 150 billion / $40 billion USD), with Samsung C&T’s participation remaining at the pre-qualification and expression-of-interest stage as of available evidence and no contract award publicly confirmed 1. All published NTA route maps show the three planned Metro lines operating entirely within pre-1967 internationally recognised Israeli territory, with no evidence suggesting planned extensions into the West Bank or East Jerusalem 1.

Supply Chain Integration with Defence Primes

Samsung Electronics (Samsung Foundry division) publicly announced a Design Service Partner (DSP) agreement with Avnet ASIC Israel (AAI), which operates as a turn-key ASIC design and manufacturing partner with Samsung Foundry fabricating the resultant chips, and AAI’s own marketing identifies “defense,” “homeland security,” and “government” among its served sectors 6. The Samsung Foundry DSP programme structure means Samsung Foundry manufactures chips designed by DSP partners such as AAI; Samsung Foundry does not typically publish end-customer identities for chips designed through DSP intermediaries, and no specific named Israeli defence prime (Elbit Systems, Israel Aerospace Industries, Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, or IMI Systems) has been publicly confirmed as an AAI/Samsung Foundry customer for defence application ASICs 6. Valens Semiconductor (Israeli automotive chip company) is a confirmed Samsung Foundry customer for automotive chips manufactured on the SF4A (4nm) process, representing a commercial (civilian) relationship 7.

A 2016 Elbit Systems quarterly 6-K SEC filing and Reuters reporting confirmed a partnership between Samsung SDS and Cyberbit (an Elbit Systems subsidiary) to deploy SCADAShield (ICS/SCADA security) to customers in the Asia Pacific region 8. No public evidence has been identified confirming whether this partnership is ongoing, expanded, or terminated 8. No public evidence identified of joint development programmes, co-production agreements, technology transfer arrangements, or licensed manufacturing agreements between any Samsung subsidiary and Israeli defence firms 1.

Logistical Sustainment & Base Services

Bynet Data Communications, part of the RAD-Bynet Group, is documented by Who Profits as holding contracts with the Israeli Ministry of Defence for IT infrastructure maintenance at checkpoints and at COGAT (Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories) facilities, including biometric systems serving the military administration of the West Bank 2. Bynet’s own corporate website lists the company as an authorised Samsung solutions partner and integrator for audio-visual and display systems 2. The Who Profits profile documents Bynet’s role in maintaining IT infrastructure for the Civil Administration (COGAT) in the West Bank and at military checkpoints, with contract values including: 2023 ICA biometric project: NIS 73,494; 2022: NIS 524,467; 2020: NIS 713,015 2. However, the Who Profits profile does not specifically name Samsung-branded products as the equipment deployed at these facilities, with equipment listed as “ICT equipment” or specifically “Cisco Systems” rather than Samsung brand in contract line items 2.

Bynet’s documented COGAT contracts involve installations in the West Bank, including checkpoint infrastructure at Hashmonaim, Bitunya, Gilboa, Reihan, and Jab’a 2.

Munitions, Weapons Systems & Strategic Platforms

Samsung Group was historically a prime contractor for lethal military platforms through two subsidiaries: Samsung Techwin (prime contractor for K9 Thunder 155mm self-propelled howitzer, K10 ammunition resupply vehicle, and SGR-A1 autonomous sentry system) and Samsung Thales (joint venture with Thales SA for C4ISR systems) 1. Both subsidiaries were sold to Hanwha Group in a transaction announced in November 2014 and completed in 2015, and these entities are now Hanwha Aerospace and Hanwha Systems respectively and are legally and operationally independent of Samsung Group 9. No Samsung Group subsidiary is a prime contractor or licensed manufacturer of lethal weapons platforms, artillery systems, armoured vehicles, or tactical autonomous systems as of the temporal scope of this audit 19.

Samsung Group entities are not among the named companies in the PAX “Companies Arming Israel and Their Financiers” (June 2024) primary company list 7. No public evidence identified of Samsung Group involvement in Iron Dome, David’s Sling, Arrow anti-ballistic missile systems, F-35 programme sub-systems, Merkava main battle tank, or any other Israeli strategic platform 17.

Export Licensing, Regulatory & Legal History

No public evidence identified of any government decision — in South Korea, the United States, the European Union, or any other jurisdiction — to grant, deny, suspend, or revoke export licences specifically for Samsung products destined for Israeli military or security end-users 1.

No public evidence identified of investigations, citations, notices of violation, or enforcement actions against Samsung related to arms embargo compliance or export control violations involving Israel in any jurisdiction 1.

No public evidence identified of court proceedings, judicial reviews, arbitration proceedings, or legislative inquiries brought against Samsung specifically regarding defence supply relationships with Israel 1.

Civil Society Scrutiny & Documented Investigations

Who Profits Research Center profiles Bynet Data Communications as an occupation-complicit company on the basis of its documented IMOD and COGAT contracts, though Who Profits does not separately profile Samsung Group itself as an occupation-complicit company in its main database 25. AFSC Investigate lists Samsung Electronics in the context of its Israeli R&D operations and Samsung Next investment activity in Israel, but does not document a direct verified weapons supply or IDF contract relationship 10. PAX Netherlands “Companies Arming Israel” (June 2024) does not name Samsung Group entities in its primary company list 7. Al-Haq “Business and Human Rights: Pillaging the OPT” (July 2024) does not name Samsung Group entities among primary named companies 9.

The UN OHCHR database of business enterprises involved in activities related to Israeli settlements (HRC res. 31/36), most recently updated in 2025 with 158 companies, does NOT include Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., Samsung C&T Corporation, Samsung SDI, Samsung SDS, or any other Samsung Group entity by name in List A (companies involved) or List B (no longer involved) 11.

Samsung Next closed its Tel Aviv office in April 2024, with the BDS Movement citing this as a campaign victory 1213. Samsung has not been among the BDS Movement’s primary “top priority” campaign targets, which focus more on entities with direct roles in weapons supply or settlement construction 1213. No major institutional divestment decision by a pension fund, sovereign wealth fund, or public institution specifically citing Samsung’s Israeli defence supply has been publicly identified 1.

Samsung Next invested in approximately 70 Israeli companies over nearly a decade (2015-2024) 14. Confirmed investments include: Intezer (cybersecurity startup, $2M seed round 2016) 15; EarlySense (patient monitoring, $10M investment 2017) 13; StoreDot (EV battery startup, $18M from Samsung SDI subsidiary) 1. No Samsung Next investment in an Israeli company whose primary product is a kinetic military system, autonomous targeting tool, or IDF-specific platform has been identified in public sources 141513.

SMEX documented pre-installation of AppCloud (developed by Israeli-founded ironSource, merged with Unity Technologies in 2022) on Samsung Galaxy A and M series devices sold in the WANA (West Asia and North Africa) region, including to Palestinian users, without meaningful consent 16. Samsung did not publicly commit to removing the software from WANA-region devices, and no formal policy change, contract termination announcement regarding ironSource, or end-use monitoring commitment was publicly announced 1716. The characterisation that AppCloud constitutes a channel for Israeli state intelligence collection has not been established by publicly available technical forensic analysis or legal proceedings 1716.

The controlling principal of Samsung Group is Lee Jae-yong (Jay Y. Lee), Vice Chairman and effective head of Samsung Electronics 3. Lee Jae-yong visited Israel in September 2023, inspecting Samsung R&D center and Samsung Next investments 3. No public record has been identified of Lee Jae-yong holding a position on any Israeli defence company board, making a documented donation to Friends of the IDF (FIDF) or equivalent reservist funds, holding equity in Israeli defence primes, or making a public co-belligerency statement regarding the Gaza conflict 3.

Samsung has not publicly acknowledged the ICJ Advisory Opinion of July 2024 or the ICC arrest warrants of November 2024 in the context of its Israeli business activities or supply relationships 3. Samsung Next’s closure of its Tel Aviv office in April 2024 preceded both the ICJ Advisory Opinion and ICC arrest warrants, and Samsung did not cite legal, reputational, or human rights considerations in its public statement 1412.

End Notes

Footnotes

  1. https://www.israeldefense.co.il/en/node/41360 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14 ↩15 ↩16 ↩17 ↩18

  2. https://www.whoprofits.org/companies/company/6526 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9

  3. https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/business/companies/20231002/samsung-chief-visits-middle-east-to-explore-new-businesses ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5

  4. https://news.samsung.com/us/samsung-introduces-galaxy-tab-active5-tactical-edition-new-tablet-delivers-greater-functionality-security-precision-military-operations ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7

  5. https://www.whoprofits.org/companies/company/samsung-electronics ↩ ↩2

  6. https://semiconductor.samsung.com/news-events/news/samsung-electronics-partners-with-avnet-asic-israel-to-strengthen-customer-support-at-the-forefront-of-asic-design-services ↩ ↩2

  7. https://www.paxforpeace.nl/publications/companies-arming-israel-and-their-financiers/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  8. https://www.reuters.com/article/technology/elbit-gets-samsung-sds-deal-for-critical-infrastructure-security-idUSKBN13B0TY ↩ ↩2

  9. https://www.alhaq.org/publications/22218.html ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  10. https://investigate.afsc.org/company/samsung ↩

  11. https://www.ohchr.org/en/business/bhr-database ↩

  12. https://bdsmovement.net/news/samsung-next-withdraws-from-israel ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  13. https://www.timesofisrael.com/samsung-makes-second-big-israel-investment-in-a-week ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  14. https://www.calcalistech.com/ctechnews/article/by1p82me0 ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  15. https://en.globes.co.il/en/article-israeli-cyber-security-co-intezer-raises-2m-1001167029 ↩ ↩2

  16. https://smex.org/open-letter-to-samsung-end-forced-israeli-app-installations-in-the-wana-region/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  17. https://www.forbes.com/sites/zakdoffman/2025/11/18/has-samsung-installed-unremovable-israeli-spyware-on-your-phone ↩ ↩2