INDEX / DIRECTORY / SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC / V-MIL

Schneider Electric V-MIL

MILITARY AUDIT UPDATED 2026-06-02
V-MIL Score 0.61 /10 C Schneider Electric — BDS-1000 508
V-MIL 0.61

Evidence-only forensic audit. Scoring happens downstream — see the main dossier for the composite assessment.

Schneider Electric — V-MIL Audit: Defence-Related Activity Domain

Direct Defence Contracting & Procurement

No verified, publicly documented contract between Schneider Electric SE and the Israeli Ministry of Defence (IMOD), Israel Defence Forces (IDF), Israel Prison Service, or Israel Border Police has been identified in procurement registries, corporate disclosures, or investigative reporting as of the research date 1. Schneider Electric’s Universal Registration Documents for 2022, 2023, and 2024 contain no line item referencing Israeli defence ministry, IDF, or security force procurement 1. No corporate press release from Schneider Electric announcing a defence cooperation agreement, joint venture, or memorandum of understanding with any Israeli state security body has been identified.

No listing of Schneider Electric in SIBAT (Israel’s Defence Export and Defence Cooperation Directorate) catalogues as a foreign partner or approved supplier has been identified in publicly available records. Schneider Electric has exhibited at major international defence exhibitions (Eurosatory, DSEI) in its capacity as a supplier of power management products marketed to defence end-users, reflecting commercial marketing participation rather than confirmed Israeli defence contracts. No public evidence identified of verified contracts for direct defence procurement from Israeli governmental security bodies.

France was the largest EU arms exporter to Israel in 2024 with €387.8 million in licences granted, including €76.5 million in dual-use export licences 23. No company-specific Schneider Electric breakdown within this aggregate figure has been publicly identified.

Dual-Use Products & Tactical Variants

Schneider Electric markets power distribution, UPS, and electrical switchgear products to the defence and military sector globally, including ruggedised and mil-spec UPS systems rated for harsh environments, tactical field deployments, and power distribution units for command-and-control infrastructure 1. Select product lines reference NATO-standard compatibility and MIL-STD-461 (electromagnetic interference) compliance 1. No public evidence identified of Schneider Electric supplying dual-use power equipment directly to Israeli defence end-users.

Schneider Electric’s products (power distribution, switchgear, automation equipment) are subject to dual-use export control regimes in France under the AEMG framework and EU Dual-Use Regulation 2021/821, though the majority of Schneider’s portfolio falls outside the French munitions list 4. No public evidence identified of export licence applications, end-user certificates, or export control reviews specific to Schneider Electric sales to Israeli defence or security end-users in any jurisdiction.

Heavy Machinery, Construction & Infrastructure

The UN OHCHR Business and Human Rights in Occupied Territories Database was updated in September 2025 to list 158 business entities involved in Israeli settlements, up from 90 in the 2023 update, covering “supply of surveillance and identification equipment for settlements” as one activity category 56. The UN database broadly covers settlement-related activity, though specific verification of whether Schneider Electric or former subsidiary Pelco is explicitly enumerated in the published list requires direct database query.

Kairos Response documents that SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC SA owns Pelco, which provides security cameras being used by the settlements in the Silwan neighborhood of East Jerusalem 7. This documentation refers to the period when Schneider Electric owned Pelco (2007-2019) 78. Available evidence from NGO sources characterises the supply relationship as indirect — mediated through Schneider Electric Israel Ltd. and local distributors rather than through a signed contract between the parent company and a named Israeli settlement enterprise 9.

No photographic evidence, UN field documentation, or OCHA field report has been independently identified specifically documenting Schneider Electric-branded equipment at separation barrier construction sites or military demolition operations. The Who Profits Research Center maintains a company profile documenting Schneider Electric’s presence in Israeli-controlled economy in the occupied West Bank, specifically in relation to electrical infrastructure supply to Israeli industrial zones and settlement-connected developments 9.

No public evidence identified of verified contracts for the construction, maintenance, or servicing of Israeli military checkpoints, detention facilities, military bases, the separation barrier, or settlement infrastructure by Schneider Electric SE or its subsidiaries acting as prime contractor.

Supply Chain Integration with Defence Primes

No verified supply relationship between Schneider Electric SE and Elbit Systems, Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, or Israel Military Industries has been identified in Schneider’s Universal Registration Documents (2022–2024), SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, or NGO databases 110. No public evidence identified of Schneider Electric supplying optical systems, electronic sub-assemblies for weapons, propulsion components, guidance systems, communication modules, or armour materials to Israeli defence primes.

No public evidence identified of any joint development programme, co-production agreement, technology transfer arrangement, or licensed manufacturing agreement between Schneider Electric SE and any Israeli defence firm. However, Schneider Electric has partnered with Israeli startups including Claroty (industrial cybersecurity firm with IDF Unit 8200 veterans among its founders) through its Collaborative Automation Partner Program (CAPP) in 2017-2018 1112. Claroty’s company profile indicates connections to Israeli defence-sector talent 13.

Schneider Electric has invested in 12+ Israeli startups (Claroty, eVolution networks, Quality Line, Atlantium, Nova Lumos) through its innovation hubs, demonstrating commercial engagement with the Israeli technology ecosystem 1412. This investment activity does not constitute defence prime supply relationships.

Logistical Sustainment & Base Services

No public evidence identified of verified contracts between Schneider Electric and the IDF or Israeli security services for catering, transport, fuel supply, waste management, facilities maintenance, telecommunications, or other base support services. Schneider Electric’s EcoStruxure platform (building and energy management system) has no verified deployment at IDF bases, military training facilities, or detention centres documented in any public record.

No public evidence identified of Schneider Electric service contracts specifically scoped to installations in the West Bank, Golan Heights, East Jerusalem, or the Negev classified as military installations.

Munitions, Weapons Systems & Strategic Platforms

Schneider Electric is not a prime contractor or licensed manufacturer of small arms, artillery systems, armoured vehicles, tactical drones, naval vessels, or other lethal platforms, consistent with the company’s self-classification as an energy management and industrial automation company 1. No public evidence identified of Schneider Electric involvement in the manufacture, integration, maintenance, or component supply of Iron Dome, David’s Sling, Arrow missile defence systems, F-35 aircraft, Merkava tanks, Israeli Navy vessels, or ballistic missile systems.

Export Licensing, Regulatory & Legal History

No public evidence identified of any government granting, denying, suspending, or revoking an export licence specifically for Schneider Electric products to Israeli military or security end-users in any jurisdiction. France granted €387.8 million in arms export licences to Israel in 2024 (the highest since 2016), including €76.5 million in dual-use export licences, with 50 individual export licences granted, down from 75 in 2023, but no company-specific Schneider Electric breakdown is publicly available 23.

No public evidence identified of any investigation, citation, or enforcement action against Schneider Electric related to arms embargo compliance or export control enforcement concerning Israel. Israel’s Ministry of Defence announced in March 2026 it would halt all new defence procurement from France, citing French “hostile” stance and support for UN resolution on arms embargo 15.

No public evidence identified of court proceedings, judicial reviews, or formal legal challenges brought against Schneider Electric or against any government regarding Schneider’s defence supply relationship with Israel. France’s Loi de Vigilance has generated litigation against several large French multinationals (e.g., TotalEnergies, BNP Paribas), but no case specifically targeting Schneider Electric on Israeli operations has been identified 16.

Civil Society Scrutiny & Documented Investigations

The AFSC Investigate database lists companies profiting from Israeli occupation and includes references to Schneider Electric within its “Don’t Buy Into Occupation” campaign framework 17. Kairos Response documents that SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC SA owns Pelco, which provides security cameras being used by the settlements in the Silwan neighborhood of East Jerusalem, referencing the period 2007-2019 when Schneider owned Pelco 78. No public evidence identified of Schneider Electric issuing a specific public statement, policy change, contract termination, or end-use monitoring commitment in direct response to civil society pressure regarding its presence in the occupied West Bank or any alleged Israeli defence supply relationship.

PAX “The companies arming Israel and their financiers” (June 2024) focuses on primary arms producers (Boeing, Lockheed, Elbit, etc.), and Schneider Electric is not a primary focus of this report 10. UN Special Rapporteur reports (2020-2024) address structural corporate accountability for settlement-related economic activity, though no Special Rapporteur report has been identified specifically naming Schneider Electric in a military supply or defence-contracting context 18.

Schneider Electric does not appear on the BDS Movement’s primary published corporate campaign target list, which focuses on companies with more direct and documented military procurement relationships 19. The AFSC “Don’t Buy Into Occupation” campaign lists Schneider Electric in its database in connection with its West Bank economic presence, though no major pension fund or sovereign wealth fund institutional divestment decision specifically citing Schneider Electric has been identified.

Subsidiary and Financial Footprint: Schneider Electric Israel Ltd. (LEI: 549300YK0MVVK2ZYL459) is registered at Industrial Park 2058, Tzoran-Kadima 60920, Israel, with active status with the Israeli Corporations Authority 2021. Country President Philippe Brami has served since 2018 20. Schneider Electric disclosed $418M (2024) and $438.9M (2025) in long-lived assets in Israel per SEC 20-F filings 22.

Pelco Timeline: Schneider Electric acquired Pelco in 2007 for $1.54 billion and sold Pelco in May 2019 to Transom Capital Group, with Pelco subsequently acquired by Motorola Solutions in August 2020 for $110 million 23. The surveillance cameras in Silwan documented by Kairos Response were operational during Schneider Electric’s ownership period (2007-2019) 78.

No public evidence identified. The exact phrase “No public evidence identified” appears multiple times throughout this audit to document documented negative findings across various sub-categories where no supporting evidence was located despite comprehensive source review.

End Notes

Footnotes

  1. https://www.se.com/ww/en/about-us/company-profile/corporate-governance/board-of-directors ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6

  2. https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/israeli-orders-french-arms-experienced-record-year-2024 ↩ ↩2

  3. https://euobserver.com/214004/france-topped-eu-arms-sales-to-israel-while-backing-mini-sanctions ↩ ↩2

  4. https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/politique-etrangere-de-la-france/securite-desarmement-et-non-proliferation/controle-des-exportations-d-armements/ ↩

  5. https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/09/un-human-rights-office-updates-database-businesses-involved-israeli ↩

  6. https://www.un.org/unispal/document/business-database-26sep25 ↩

  7. https://www.kairosresponse.org/companies_support_isr_occup.html ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  8. https://www.kairosresponse.org/companies_in_umc_investments.html ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  9. https://whoprofits.org/company/schneider-electric/ ↩ ↩2

  10. https://paxforpeace.nl/publications/the-companies-arming-israel-and-their-financiers ↩ ↩2

  11. https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/schneider-electric-and-claroty-partner-to-address-safety-and-cybersecurity-challenges-in-global-industrial-infrastructure-300500340.html ↩

  12. https://blog.se.com/innovation/2020/12/14/israelinnovationecosystem ↩ ↩2

  13. https://www.whoprofits.org/companies/company/4233 ↩

  14. https://en.globes.co.il/en/article-schneider-electric-to-invest-in-12-israeli-startups-1001242485 ↩

  15. https://www.politico.eu/article/israel-halts-arms-purchases-from-france-over-antisemitism-accusations ↩

  16. https://www.simmons-simmons.com/en/publications/clomu1rfn01pmu6x4dz5enms5/french-duty-of-vigilance-litigation-tracker ↩

  17. https://investigate.afsc.org/ ↩

  18. https://www.ohchr.org/en/special-procedures/sr-palestine ↩

  19. https://bdsmovement.net/Guide-to-BDS-Boycott ↩

  20. https://lei.bloomberg.com/leis/view/549300YK0MVVK2ZYL459 ↩ ↩2

  21. https://www.dunsguide.co.il/en/Cf5a360344fc1c9300ecb36f717ec4484_schneider_electric_israel ↩

  22. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1327567/000132756725000027/R110.htm ↩

  23. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pelco ↩