V-MIL Domain Audit: Surfshark

Target Company: Surfshark (Surfshark B.V., subsidiary of Nord Security) Audit Phase: V-MIL Date of Audit: 2026-05-01 Jurisdiction of Incorporation: Netherlands (Surfshark B.V.) Corporate Parent: Nord Security (merger of NordVPN and Surfshark, 2022)¹

Direct Defence Contracting & Procurement

No public evidence identified.

Surfshark’s product portfolio consists entirely of consumer and SME-oriented virtual private network (VPN) software, antivirus tooling, data breach alert services, and privacy-focused browser extensions.² No contract, tender award, framework agreement, or memorandum of understanding with the Israeli Ministry of Defence (IMOD), Israel Defence Forces (IDF), Israel Prison Service, Israel Border Police, or any other Israeli state security body has been identified in any publicly available procurement database, corporate disclosure, or press reporting.

• SIBAT export directory: No Surfshark listing identified in the SIBAT (Israel Defence Export and Defence Cooperation Directorate) public-facing export directory, in Israeli defence exhibition catalogues (including ISDEF or HLS & Cyber Israel), or in any defence procurement registry in connection with Israeli state contracts.
• Israeli Government Procurement Portal (mr.gov.il): Full-text search for “Surfshark” returned a null result. No tender, contract award, or framework listing has been identified.²
• Corporate press releases: No corporate press release, government announcement, or trade press report detailing defence cooperation, joint ventures, or partnership agreements between Surfshark and any Israeli defence entity has been identified.²¹
• Netherlands KVK filings: Netherlands Chamber of Commerce (KVK) registration records for Surfshark B.V. disclose only general incorporation data; no defence contract or government security sector engagement is disclosed.²

Dual-Use Products & Tactical Variants

No public evidence identified.

Surfshark does not manufacture or publicly market ruggedised, tactical, mil-spec, or defence-grade variants of its products. Its product line is software-only — comprising VPN protocols, cybersecurity suites, and consumer privacy tools — distributed via consumer app stores and standard commercial licensing.²

• Militarised product lines: No tactical or military-specified product variant has been identified in any product catalogue, patent filing, or trade press coverage. Searches of the USPTO, EPO, and Israeli Patent Office patent databases returned no Surfshark filing in a defence-relevant technology class.
• Civilian-to-military distinction: As no military-specified product variant has been identified, no formal civilian-to-military distinction analysis can be performed. Surfshark’s VPN and privacy software is commercially available to any end user, including potentially government or military personnel purchasing as individual subscribers, but no evidence of institutional or contract-based military supply has been identified.²
• End-user certification and export licensing: No export licence application, end-user certificate, or government export control review related to Surfshark’s sales to Israeli defence or security end-users has been identified in Netherlands, EU, or any other jurisdiction’s public records. The EU Dual-Use Export Control Regulation enforcement notices from the Netherlands competent authority contain no Surfshark filing.² The UK Strategic Export Controls licensing database (LITE/SPIRE) likewise contains no Surfshark entry.
• Domain boundary test: The audit instructions’ domain boundary test — does the product’s designed output produce a targeting decision or weapons effect? — yields a negative result for all Surfshark products. Surfshark’s VPN and privacy software is not purpose-built to enable kinetic military effects and has no identified weapons-integration application.²

Heavy Machinery, Construction & Infrastructure

No public evidence identified. This domain section is structurally inapplicable to Surfshark’s business model.

Surfshark is a software company with no hardware, machinery, vehicle, or construction equipment product line.² It has no verified presence in construction, demolition, or infrastructure activity within Israeli settlements, the separation barrier, military installations, or occupied territories.

• Who Profits Research Center database: No Surfshark entry identified.³
• UN OCHA and UN Special Rapporteur on OPT reports (2020–2025): No Surfshark mention identified in any report addressing corporate involvement in occupied territory infrastructure.
• Human Rights Watch: No Surfshark mention identified in reports on corporate complicity in occupied territories (2020–2024).⁴
• Amnesty International: No Surfshark mention identified in corporate accountability reports related to Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory (2021–2024).⁵

No NGO report, UN documentation, or photographic evidence placing Surfshark equipment or personnel in any occupied territory has been identified across any queried source class.

Supply Chain Integration with Defence Primes

No public evidence identified.

Surfshark provides no physical components, sub-systems, raw materials, or specialist manufacturing services. As a software-only entity, it does not produce optical systems, electronic sub-assemblies, propulsion components, structural materials, guidance systems, communication modules, or armour materials.

• Elbit Systems: Annual reports and supplier disclosures (2020–2024) contain no Surfshark supply relationship.²
• Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI): Public procurement and supplier records contain no Surfshark relationship.²
• Rafael Advanced Defense Systems: Public corporate disclosures contain no Surfshark relationship.²
• Joint development and co-production: No joint development programme, co-production agreement, technology transfer arrangement, or licensed manufacturing agreement between Surfshark and any Israeli defence firm has been identified in any corporate disclosure, annual report, or supplier registry.²¹
• SIPRI Arms Transfers Database: No Surfshark transfer, licensing arrangement, or arms trade entry identified.⁶

Logistical Sustainment & Base Services

No public evidence identified. This domain section is structurally inapplicable to Surfshark’s business model.

Surfshark does not operate in catering, transport, fuel supply, waste management, facilities maintenance, telecommunications infrastructure, shipping, freight forwarding, or port handling.² No service contract between Surfshark and any IDF base, military training facility, detention centre, or security installation has been identified.

• Israeli government procurement portal: Full-text search returned null result for any logistics or services contract.²
• Corporate disclosures and employee profiles: LinkedIn corporate profile data for Surfshark shows no defence-sector clients in publicly visible employee roles or B2B client sector indicators.²
• Technology press (TechCrunch, Wired, The Register): Business and product coverage of Surfshark (2019–2025) identifies no defence sector service contracts or base services activity.¹

Munitions, Weapons Systems & Strategic Platforms

No public evidence identified. This domain section is structurally inapplicable to Surfshark’s business model.

Surfshark has no verified role as a prime contractor or licensed manufacturer of any lethal system, munitions, precursor material, or strategic defence platform.² It has no identified involvement in Iron Dome, David’s Sling, Arrow, fighter aircraft programmes, main battle tank supply chains, warships, or ballistic missile systems. It supplies no guidance electronics, fire-control systems, radar components, propulsion units, or warhead casings.

• Elbit Systems, IAI, Rafael, and IMI annual reports and supplier disclosures (2020–2024): No Surfshark mention identified in any munitions or weapons system supply chain context.²
• SIPRI Arms Transfers Database: No Surfshark transfer or licensing arrangement identified.⁶
• Patent databases (USPTO, EPO, Israeli Patent Office): No Surfshark patent filing in a defence-relevant technology class — including guidance, propulsion, fire control, or munitions design — has been identified.
• Domain boundary test result: Negative across all Surfshark products. The combination of a software-only product architecture and standard commercial distribution channels places Surfshark outside the typical subject profile of munitions and weapons systems investigation.

Export Licensing, Regulatory & Legal History

No public evidence identified.

• Export licence decisions: No government decision in any jurisdiction to grant, deny, suspend, or revoke an export licence for Surfshark products to Israeli military or security end-users has been identified. The Netherlands competent authority’s EU Dual-Use Export Control Regulation enforcement register contains no Surfshark filing.² UK Export Finance (UKEF) and the Netherlands export credit agency (Atradius DSB) public databases contain no Surfshark-related defence export activity.
• Arms embargo and sanctions compliance: No investigation, citation, or enforcement action related to Surfshark’s compliance with arms embargoes, export control regimes, or sanctions affecting defence trade with Israel has been identified in any jurisdiction’s public enforcement record.²
• Legal challenges and judicial review: No court proceedings, judicial reviews, or legal challenges brought against Surfshark or against any government regarding Surfshark’s defence supply relationship with Israel have been identified. Netherlands judiciary public records, EU regulatory enforcement registers, and technology press coverage (2019–2025) contain no relevant proceedings.¹
• Parliamentary scrutiny: Parliamentary records in the Netherlands, EU Parliament, and the Israeli Knesset contain no Surfshark mention in defence-related debates, written questions, or parliamentary inquiries.

Civil Society Scrutiny & Documented Investigations

No public evidence identified.

• NGO and academic reports: Surfshark does not appear in any published investigation from Who Profits³, Amnesty International⁵, Human Rights Watch⁴, the AFSC Investigate database⁷, Corporate Occupation, or any academic study or UN report (UN OCHA, UN Special Rapporteur on OPT, UN Human Rights Council) specifically addressing military, security, or dual-use supply chain relationships with the Israeli state. Academic database searches (JSTOR, SSRN, Google Scholar) returned no peer-reviewed study addressing Surfshark in a military or dual-use supply chain context.
• Boycott and divestment campaigns: Surfshark has not been the subject of any organised boycott, divestment, or exclusion campaign specifically related to defence sector activities. It does not appear in BDS Movement campaign lists⁸, nor in any pension fund or sovereign wealth fund divestment decision related to Israeli defence supply. No institutional investor exclusion on defence grounds has been identified in Crunchbase or PitchBook investor and revenue records.²
• Corporate response and policy statements: No public statement, policy change, contract termination, or end-use monitoring commitment made by Surfshark in response to civil society pressure regarding a defence supply chain has been identified.² This is consistent with the complete absence of any identified pressure campaign or NGO finding targeting the company on these grounds.
• Wayback Machine and Internet Archive: No defence-related Surfshark corporate disclosure archived across any historical snapshot has been identified.

End Notes