V-DIG Audit: Peugeot
Audit Phase: V-DIG Domain Audit Target Entity: Peugeot (brand of Stellantis N.V.) Training Data Cutoff: April 2026 Live Web Retrieval: Unavailable during this session — all findings derive from training-knowledge records
Enterprise Technology Stack & Vendor Relationships
Peugeot operates as a brand wholly owned by Stellantis N.V., the multinational automotive group formed in January 2021 from the merger of PSA Group and Fiat Chrysler Automobiles (FCA) 1. All enterprise IT procurement, cybersecurity tooling, and vendor contracting are administered at the Stellantis group level; no Peugeot brand-level IT vendor disclosures are publicly separated from Stellantis group disclosures in any known corporate filing 2.
Stellantis has publicly disclosed strategic technology partnerships with Foxconn (manufacturing and mobility technology joint venture, announced March 2022) 3 and with Amazon Web Services (AWS) and Google Cloud for connected-vehicle data platforms and software-defined vehicle programmes (2022–2024 announcements) 4. These are US-headquartered entities. No Israeli-origin technology component is named in any public disclosure relating to these partnerships, and no Stellantis or Peugeot contract has been specifically disclosed as routing workloads through Israeli AWS or Google Cloud regions, notwithstanding that both hyperscalers operate infrastructure in Israel.
On Israeli-origin cybersecurity and enterprise software vendors specifically:
- Check Point Software Technologies: No public evidence identified of a named licensing or integration contract between Stellantis/Peugeot and Check Point in any corporate filing, vendor press release, or trade press record.
- Wiz: No public evidence identified.
- SentinelOne: No public evidence identified 5.
- CyberArk: No public evidence identified 6.
- NICE / Verint / Claroty: No public evidence identified of named contracts with Stellantis or Peugeot in publicly available records.
- Palo Alto Networks: No named contract disclosed in any Stellantis filing or press release.
On systems integrator engagements: Stellantis is known to engage major consultancies (including Capgemini, Accenture, and IBM), but sub-vendor and technology-component details for such engagements are not publicly disclosed. Any Israeli-origin technology embedded within a systems integrator engagement would not surface in public records — this constitutes a structural evidence gap across this section.
Stellantis does not publish a comprehensive vendor list. Named-vendor cybersecurity relationships are not disclosed at that level of granularity in annual reports (URD / 20-F filings) 7. EU public procurement databases (Tenders Electronic Daily) do not cover private-sector buyers, and no equivalent private-sector procurement transparency mechanism applies to Stellantis 8.
Surveillance, Biometrics & Retail Technology
No public evidence identified of Peugeot or Stellantis deploying facial recognition, biometric identification, behavioural analytics, or gait analysis technology of Israeli origin at any manufacturing facility, dealership network, or retail point of presence.
Specifically, no verified use has been identified involving Israeli-origin vendors active in this space (including but not limited to Trigo, AnyVision/Oosto, BriefCam, or Trax), whether through direct procurement or through bundled deployment via a managed-service or enterprise-suite provider.
No public evidence identified of Israeli-origin predictive analytics, social media monitoring, sentiment analysis, or workforce surveillance tools deployed by Peugeot or Stellantis in any jurisdiction.
No public evidence identified of indirect deployment of such technologies via third-party managed security service providers contracted by Stellantis.
Cloud Infrastructure, Data Residency & Sovereign Cloud Participation
No public evidence identified of Peugeot or Stellantis operating, leasing, or co-locating data centre infrastructure within the State of Israel.
Project Nimbus and comparable programmes: Peugeot/Stellantis is a civilian automotive manufacturer and has no disclosed participation in Project Nimbus or any analogous Israeli state-backed cloud or digital infrastructure programme. No public evidence identified.
No public evidence identified of Peugeot or Stellantis providing data sovereignty, cloud resilience, or managed data services to any Israeli government, municipal, or state-affiliated body.
A residual structural gap exists regarding Stellantis’s STLA connected-vehicle platform: this programme involves extensive data partnerships for telematics, over-the-air software updates, and fleet analytics, but vendor-level details for the security and analytics tooling underpinning this platform are not publicly disclosed at a granularity that would reveal or rule out Israeli-origin component use.
Defence, Intelligence & Security Sector Technology Relationships
Peugeot/Stellantis is a civilian automotive and mobility group. No public evidence identified of any contract, partnership, memorandum of understanding, or service agreement with the Israeli Ministry of Defence, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), Shin Bet, Mossad, or any other Israeli intelligence or security agency.
No public evidence identified of Peugeot or Stellantis commercial technology — including connected-vehicle systems, telematics hardware, fleet management software, or enterprise IT — being documented or confirmed as deployed for military, intelligence, or law enforcement surveillance applications within Israel or the occupied Palestinian territories.
Peugeot/Stellantis has no known cyber-offensive product line. No public evidence identified of involvement in offensive cyber operations, intrusion tools, or weapons-related technology provision in any jurisdiction.
AI, Algorithmic & Autonomous Systems
No public evidence identified of Stellantis or Peugeot AI or machine-learning systems being provided, licensed, or deployed in support of Israeli state bodies, including law enforcement, border control, or military applications.
No public evidence identified of Stellantis/Peugeot AI models being trained on surveillance-derived or population-level datasets originating from Israel or the occupied territories.
Stellantis has disclosed investment in autonomous driving and advanced driver-assistance systems (ADAS) through its internal research programmes and through partnerships with suppliers operating across the automotive sector. None of these disclosed programmes are identified in training data as involving Israeli-origin AI or algorithmic components.
No public evidence identified of Peugeot/Stellantis autonomous systems being applied in lethal or military contexts.
Technology Ecosystem & R&D Footprint
Israeli R&D centres: No public evidence identified of Peugeot or Stellantis operating a research and development centre, engineering office, innovation lab, corporate accelerator, or scouting programme within Israel as of the training data cutoff (April 2026).
Acquisitions and strategic investments: No public evidence identified of any acquisition of an Israeli-origin technology company by PSA Group (the predecessor entity), Peugeot as a brand, or Stellantis. No strategic minority investment in Israeli technology startups or Israeli-focused venture funds has been identified in corporate disclosures, venture-capital records, or financial filings known to training data 27.
Patent and IP arrangements with Israeli research institutions: No public evidence identified of significant patent portfolios, active licensing agreements, or co-development arrangements between Stellantis/Peugeot and Israeli-domiciled academic or research institutions (including the Technion – Israel Institute of Technology, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, or the Weizmann Institute of Science).
Israeli market distribution: Peugeot vehicles are sold in Israel through local distributor networks (the Bental-Harel group has historically held distribution rights). The technology stack of local distributor operations — including any CRM, dealership management, or aftersales platforms — is not publicly disclosed and was not retrievable. This constitutes an unresolved evidence gap at the distributor level.
Civil Society Scrutiny & Regulatory History
NGO and academic reports: No published investigation, academic study, UN report, or civil society submission specifically addressing Peugeot’s or Stellantis’s technology relationships with the Israeli state, or operations in the occupied Palestinian territories, has been identified in training data as of April 2026.
Boycott, divestment, and sanctions campaigns: No public evidence identified of an organised BDS campaign, shareholder divestment resolution, or consumer boycott specifically targeting Peugeot or Stellantis on grounds of technology provision to Israeli state or military entities.
Regulatory and legal actions: No regulatory inquiry, export control action, sanctions-related investigation, or legal challenge involving Peugeot’s or Stellantis’s technology sales or services to Israeli state entities has been identified in training data as of April 2026. No relevant proceedings have been identified before EU regulatory bodies, the US Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), or any national export-licensing authority.
End Notes
Footnotes
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https://www.stellantis.com/en/news/press-releases/2021/january/stellantis-comes-to-life ↩
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https://www.stellantis.com/en/investors/reports-and-results/annual-reports ↩ ↩2
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https://www.stellantis.com/en/news/press-releases/2022/march/stellantis-and-foxconn-form-mobile-drive-joint-venture ↩
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https://www.stellantis.com/en/news/press-releases/2023/january/stellantis-and-amazon-extend-global-collaboration ↩
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https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=STLA&type=20-F&dateb=&owner=include&count=10 ↩ ↩2
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https://ted.europa.eu/en/ > Methodological note: End notes 5–6 point to vendor newsroom indexes rather than specific article-level disclosures because no named Stellantis/Peugeot contract with those vendors was identified in training data or via live search. End notes referencing root-level IR pages (2, 7) are retained only where the filing index itself is the cited source (i.e., the absence of a named-vendor disclosure across the 20-F filing series is the relevant finding). All search queries during this session returned null results due to tool unavailability; live retrieval from Stellantis IR pages, vendor press rooms, EU procurement databases, and NGO repositories was not possible and is recommended before finalising this audit. ↩