Digital Audit - Ferrari

Domain: Digital (Digital / Technology nexus) Entity scope: Ferrari N.V. (NYSE / Borsa Italiana: RACE; Dutch-incorporated, operations in Maranello, Italy), including the Scuderia Ferrari HP Formula 1 team. Ferrari’s own technology acts are in scope. The controlling shareholder Exor N.V. (Agnelli family), the sibling company Stellantis, Piero Ferrari, and Ferrari dealers/importers are attributed at their own level and flagged where relevant. Directionality: the serious case is Ferrari providing digital/surveillance/cyber technology to the Israeli state - Ferrari procuring technology from Israeli-linked vendors is a weaker customer-side relationship and is recorded as such. Only genuinely Israeli-domiciled vendors count as Israeli-origin; Israeli-founded but foreign-domiciled firms, and foreign vendors with Israeli R&D, are flagged as such. Compiled: 2026-06-26 Method: Live web search (≈22 queries) against Ferrari/AWS/IBM/HP/Bitdefender/Harman press, SEC Form 20-F, vendor and trade press, and NGO databases. No model training data.

Enterprise Technology Stack & Vendor Relationships

Ferrari’s named technology partners are predominantly US-headquartered vendors, with Ferrari in the role of customer.

Amazon Web Services (US, Seattle) became Ferrari’s “Official Cloud, Machine Learning, and Artificial Intelligence Provider” in June 2021, spanning the road-car division, GT Competitions, Ferrari Challenge, and the F1 team; Ferrari uses the AWS Europe (Milan) region and Amazon SageMaker for race-data processing¹². IBM (US, Armonk) was named the Official Fan Engagement and Data Analytics Partner of Scuderia Ferrari HP in November 2024, delivering a watsonx-powered mobile app from 2025³⁴. HP Inc. (US, Palo Alto) became F1 title partner (“Scuderia Ferrari HP”) in April 2024, supplying PCs, conferencing, and printing across operations⁵. Additional partners are also non-Israeli: Qualcomm (US, San Diego) for the Snapdragon Digital Chassis in road cars (2022)⁶, and DXC Technology (US, Virginia) for in-car HMI/infotainment software (2023)⁷.

Ferrari’s exclusive cybersecurity partner - a relationship the previous audit could not identify - is Bitdefender, whose GravityZone platform Ferrari deploys across its road-car manufacturing, F1 pit-wall systems, and workstation estate; the partnership was reported as a response to Ferrari’s 2023 breach and was extended in 2025⁸⁹. Bitdefender is Romanian-domiciled (Bucharest), not Israeli.

No public evidence was identified of Ferrari holding any licensing, subscription, integration, or managed-services relationship with an Israeli-domiciled enterprise or cybersecurity vendor (Check Point, NICE, CyberArk, Cognyte, or others), nor with Israeli-founded but US-domiciled firms (SentinelOne, Verint, Claroty, Wiz)⁸.

One in-cabin relationship carries a genuine Israeli R&D dimension and is recorded explicitly. Ferrari procures in-cabin technology - including the Harman Ready Care driver-monitoring system and Ready Upgrade hardware - from Harman International, a US-domiciled vendor (Stamford, CT; a Samsung subsidiary)¹⁰. Harman’s relevant in-cabin and over-the-air R&D is substantially conducted at Harman Israel (Hod HaSharon, formerly Red Bend Software, acquired by Harman in 2015), and Israeli technology press has described Ferrari as putting “Israel-made Harman components in the cabin”¹¹¹². Under brand-floor discipline this is a customer-side procurement from a US-domiciled supplier whose engineering is partly Israeli - weaker than a direct Israeli-domiciled procurement, but a real and documented nexus.

Surveillance, Biometrics & Retail Technology

No public evidence was identified of Ferrari deploying facial-recognition, biometric-identification, or behavioural-analytics technology of Israeli origin (Oosto/AnyVision, BriefCam, Corsight) at its Maranello factory, dealer network, museums, or F1 hospitality environments. Ferrari’s disclosed biometric activity is in-vehicle driver monitoring (fatigue/distraction detection via Harman Ready Care), an automotive feature rather than a site-surveillance deployment¹⁰. Vendor-level physical-security arrangements at Maranello and F1 circuits are not publicly disclosed, so an Israeli-origin component there cannot be positively excluded - an evidence gap. No public evidence was identified of Israeli-origin predictive-analytics, social-media-monitoring, or workforce-surveillance tooling at Ferrari.

Ferrari’s connected-vehicle platform, MyFerrari Connect, is controlled by Ferrari (Modena) with AWS (Milan) backend infrastructure; no Israeli-origin telematics vendor was identified and no evidence was found of customer or telematics data routed to any Israeli entity¹³.

Cloud Infrastructure, Data Residency & Sovereign Cloud Participation

No public evidence was identified that Ferrari operates, leases, or co-locates data-centre infrastructure in Israel. Ferrari’s disclosed cloud workloads run in the AWS Europe (Milan) region, not the AWS Israel (Tel Aviv) region¹².

Project Nimbus - the Israeli government cloud contract held by Amazon Web Services and Google - does not involve Ferrari: Ferrari is an unrelated AWS commercial customer, not a party, sub-provider, or beneficiary¹⁴. No public evidence was identified of Ferrari providing data-sovereignty, resilience, or managed-infrastructure services to any state body, Israeli or otherwise; Ferrari is an automotive manufacturer, not an infrastructure provider.

Defence, Intelligence & Security Sector Technology Relationships

No public evidence was identified of any contract, partnership, or service agreement between Ferrari and the Israeli Ministry of Defence, the IDF, or Israeli intelligence agencies, nor of Ferrari providing surveillance technology, data, software, or cloud capacity to the Israeli state, military, or security services - the directionally serious Digital case, for which no qualifying evidence was found. Ferrari holds no documented relationship with Israeli defence or surveillance-software firms (Elbit, Rafael, IAI, NSO, Cellebrite, Cognyte).

Ferrari was itself the victim of a ransomware-linked data breach disclosed in March 2023: a threat actor exfiltrated client contact details and issued a ransom demand, which Ferrari refused to pay, reporting no payment-data compromise. Ferrari engaged an unnamed “leading global third-party cybersecurity firm” for incident response; no Israeli-origin vendor was identified in the remediation¹⁵¹⁶. This incident was done to Ferrari and has no nexus to provision of technology to Israel.

AI, Algorithmic & Autonomous Systems

Ferrari’s documented AI/ML activity is confined to the automotive and motorsport domain - F1 race-strategy modelling on Amazon SageMaker and fan-engagement analytics on IBM watsonx¹³. No public evidence was identified of Ferrari providing AI capability, model access, training data, or inference services to any Israeli state, military, or security body, nor of Ferrari AI models being trained on datasets derived from surveillance or intelligence collection in Israel or the occupied territories. Autonomous lethal systems are outside Ferrari’s business domain. Ferrari’s internal AI runs through US-entity platforms (AWS, IBM); no Israeli-origin AI vendor was identified in its stack.

Technology Ecosystem & R&D Footprint

No public evidence was identified that Ferrari itself operates an R&D facility, engineering office, or accelerator in Israel; Ferrari’s R&D is centred on Maranello (with testing at Fiorano and Mugello). No public evidence was identified of Ferrari acquiring or taking a venture stake in any Israeli technology company, or of patent or research partnerships with Israeli institutions (Technion, Weizmann, Hebrew University). Surveys of automaker R&D and investment in Israeli mobility tech name peers (BMW, VW, Ford, GM, Daimler, Porsche) but not Ferrari¹⁷.

Two Israel-facing technology activities sit in related entities and are attributed at those entities’ own level, flagged accordingly: the controlling shareholder Exor N.V. holds direct investments in Israeli startups (Exor’s own venture activity, not Ferrari’s)¹⁸, and the sibling company Stellantis signed a 2021 memorandum of understanding with the Israel Innovation Authority to scout Israeli startups (a Stellantis act, to which Ferrari is not a party)¹⁹. Neither is attributable to Ferrari. A separately named “Ferrari Group” with an Israel office is an unrelated Italian logistics company (ferrarigroup.net), a name collision, not Ferrari N.V.²⁰

Civil Society Scrutiny & Regulatory History

No public evidence was identified of an NGO investigation, academic study, or UN report addressing Ferrari’s technology relationships with the Israeli state, Israeli defence entities, or Israeli-origin vendors; Ferrari does not appear in the Who Profits database on technology grounds. No organised BDS campaign targets Ferrari on technology provision: BDS technology campaigning targets cloud and defence suppliers (Amazon, Google, Microsoft, Intel, Elbit) over Project Nimbus and related contracts, and Ferrari is absent from those lists²¹. The March 2023 breach engaged data-protection obligations in Ferrari’s capacity as the victim of an attack and has no identified Israel nexus. No action by export-control or sanctions authorities relating to Ferrari technology sales or data transfers to Israeli entities was identified.

End Notes